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Abstract
This article examines the circumstances in which a version of Sir Karl Popper's philosophy of science
became US law. Among historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, as well as legal
commentators, the US Supreme Court's Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, .Inc. (1993) decision
has received considerable attention. The case is significant because America's most senior court
produced a definition of science (for legal purposes). This definition was authorized by the symbolic
exhumation, celebration and appropriation of key elements of the philosophy of science developed
decades earlier by Popper. Significantly, it was not just Popper's philosophy that was exhumed and
resurrected but also his standing and the social authority of philosopy more generally. This article
explores how the US Supreme Court invoked a mediated and essentialized representation of Popper's
philosophy of science - in a context where the quality of expert evidence seems to have been conceived
as a pressing socio-legal problem - to support the inauguration of a more onerous response to
admissibility decision making in federal courts. In undertaking this task we also reflect on the use of the
writings of other philosophers, historians and sociologists of science which have appeared somewhat
erratically in recent judgments. These later references have been conspicuously less influential than the
Supreme Court's attempt to grapple with the nature of science in Daubert.
In order to substantiate our claims we provide an analysis of references to the history, philosophy and
sociology of science which have appeared in US federal court decisions. Our sample was gathered using
the relatively straightforward methodology of searching the WESTLAW database for references to wellknown authors from the history, philosophy and sociology of science. The search covered the period from
the 1940's up to the time of writing. Our analysis is not quantitative (there were only a small number of
relevant citations), but rather, qualitative. The significance and meaning of citations will be assessed
against the backdrop of the wider socio-legal debates and judicial uses of Daubert.
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Conjectures and Exhumations:
Citations of History, Philosophy
and Sociology of Science in
US Federal Courts
Gary Edmond & David Mercer

1. Introduction
This article examines the circumstances in which a version of Sir Karl
Popper’s philosophy of science became US law. Among historians, philosophers and sociologists of science, as well as legal commentators, the
US Supreme Court’s Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, .Inc. (1993)
decision has received considerable attention. The case is signi cant because America’s most senior court produced a de nition of science (for
legal purposes). This de nition was authorized by the symbolic exhumation, celebration and appropriation of key elements of the philosophy of
science developed decades earlier by Popper.1 Signi cantly, it was not just
Popper’s philosophy that was exhumed and resurrected but also his standing and the social authority of philosopy more generally. This article
explores how the US Supreme Court invoked a mediated and essentialized
representation of Popper’s philosophy of science — in a context where the
quality of expert evidence seems to have been conceived as a pressing
socio-legal problem — to support the inauguration of a more onerous
response to admissibility decision making in federal courts. In undertaking this task we also re ect on the use of the writings of other philosophers, historians and sociologists of science which have appeared somewhat erratically in recent judgments. These later references have been
conspicuously less in uential than the Supreme Court’s attempt to grapple
with the nature of science in Daubert.
In order to substantiate our claims we provide an analysis of references to the history, philosophy and sociology of science which have
appeared in US federal court decisions. Our sample was gathered using
the relatively straightforward methodology of searching the WESTLAW
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database for references to well-known authors from the history, philosophy and sociology of science (see Appendix). The search covered the
period from the 1940’s up to the time of writing. Our analysis is not
quantitative (there were only a small number of relevant citations), but
rather, qualitative. The signi cance and meaning of citations will be
assessed against the backdrop of the wider socio-legal debates and judicial
uses of Daubert.

2. Daubert: The legal apotheosis of Popper
For those interested in expert evidence or the interactions between law
and science more generally, the Daubert decision represents the most
important judgment in recent years. Confronted with a range of inconsistent approaches to the admission of expert opinion evidence under the
Federal Rules of Evidence (1975) (“FRE”), particularly concerning the
application of the “general acceptance” test (drawn from Frye), the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear an appeal from a Bendectin case.2
Litigation over the teratogenic effects of Bendectin had been running in
the federal courts for over a decade: although from the mid 1980s appellate courts had begun to exclude plaintiff ’s expert evidence, predominantly through an express preference for published epidemiological evidence on the issue of causation.3 The Daubert judgment, however, con ned itself to the issue of admissibility standards for expert opinion
evidence under the FRE and whether the Frye general acceptance test had
survived.
The entire Court agreed that the general acceptance test had not
survived the enactment of the FRE in 1975. The majority replaced Frye
with an emphasis on evidentiary reliability and an expectation that trial
judges would undertake their own assessment drawing upon the features
of “good science” and “the scienti c method.” In order to make admissibility decisions, the majority indicated that the judges were required to
determine whether the evidence was properly scienti c; that is, constituted genuine scienti c knowledge. The majority, through Justice
Blackmun’s judgment, provided four criteria, effectively a judicial tool kit,
to assist with that determination.
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining whether a theory or technique is scienti c knowl-
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edge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can
be (and has been) tested. “Scienti c methodology today
is based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see
if they can be falsi ed; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other  elds of human inquiry.”
Green 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural
Science 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scienti c explanation must be capable of empirical test”); K.
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scienti c Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the
scienti c status of a theory is its falsi ability, or refutability,
or testability”) (emphasis deleted).
Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory
or technique has been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one element of peer
review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not
necessarily correlate with reliability, see S. Jasanoff, The
Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers 61–76 (1990),
and in some instances well-grounded but innovative theories will not have been published, see Horrobin, The
Philosophical Basis of Peer Review and the Suppression of
Innovation, 263 JAMA 1438 (1990). Some propositions,
moreover, are too particular, too new, or of too limited
interest to be published. But submission to the scrutiny
of the scienti c community is a component of “good
science,” in part because it increases the likelihood that
substantive  aws in methodology will be detected. See J.
Ziman, Reliable Knowledge: An Exploration of the Grounds
for Belief in Science 130–133 (1978); Relman & Angell,
How Good Is Peer Review?, 321 New Eng. J. Med. 827
(1989). The fact of publication (or lack thereof ) in a peer
reviewed journal thus will be a relevant, though not
dispositive, consideration in assessing the scienti c validity of a particular technique or methodology on which an
opinion is premised. 4
The  rst two criteria — “testing” and “peer review and publication” —
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are interspersed with historical, philosophical, medical, and sociological
support.5 Popper and Hempel enter Supreme Court jurisprudence via
reference to a legal academic, tort scholar Michael Green. 6 Jasanoff,
Horrobin, Ziman, Relman and Angell, all appeared in amicus curiae briefs
submitted to the Court in support of a variety of propositions. Of the
four criteria, these  rst two were the most novel. The issue of testing was
central to the Daubert judgment because it was characterized as the
scienti c method (or an essential component of it). Initially, the majority
was so con dent about the value of falsi cation/testing that they dispelled
the need to worry about an expert’s conclusions, providing the methods
were reliable: “The focus, of course, must be solely on principles and
methodology, not on the conclusions they generate.” 7 Assumptions and
practical complications underlying this rather ambitious dichotomization
were subsequently read down by the Court in General Electric Co. v.
Joiner.8
In addition to falsi cation, peer review and publication, the Daubert
majority indicated that the known or potential rate of error of a scienti c
technique and whether it has been “generally accepted” in the relevant
scienti c community (re-introducing Frye) could also have a bearing on
admissibility decisions.
Additionally, in the case of a particular scienti c technique, the court ordinarily should consider the known or
potential rate of error, see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 869
F.2d 348, 353–354 (CA7 1989) (surveying studies of the
error rate of spectrographic voice identi cation technique),
and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique’s operation, see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (CA2 1978) (noting professional organization’s standard governing spectrographic
analysis), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117, 99 S.Ct. 1025, 59
L.Ed.2d 77 (1979).
Finally, “general acceptance” can yet have a bearing
on the inquiry. A “reliability assessment does not require,
although it does permit, explicit identi cation of a relevant scienti c community and an express determination
of a particular degree of acceptance within that commu-
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nity.” United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d, at 1238. See
also 3 Weinstein & Berger ¶ 702[03], pp. 702–41 to
702–42. Widespread acceptance can be an important
factor in ruling particular evidence admissible, and “a
known technique which has been able to attract only
minimal support within the community,” Downing, 753
F.2d, at 1238, may properly be viewed with skepticism.9
The third and fourth criteria do not draw upon secondary (by which we
mean non-legal literary) support. Instead, they referred to earlier appeals
and in uential legal texts.10
At this stage it is not our intention to make an assessment of whether
the majority’s appropriation of the secondary authorities conform with
their common sociological and philosophical iterations and uses nor to
consider inconsistencies among the four criteria. Though, strictly speaking, falsi cation is normally interpreted as transcending sociologically
orientated factors such as peer review and other philosophical criteria
involved in con rmation of theories such as probabilistic analysis or the
determination of error rates. What we do wish to emphasize is the degree
of con dence invested by the majority in their Popperian inspired model
of the scienti c method and the absence, not only of con icting and
critical readings of Popper but of other philosophers and sociologists of
science. The majority’s con dence was not, however, without quali cation.
Whereas the majority expressed con dence in the utility of (what is
presented as) Popper’s criterion, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
Stevens, voiced a forceful dissent. Rehnquist CJ’s opinion exploits anxieties associated with moving conspicuously from legal discourse into
other professional domains which might render legal decisions, reasoning
and institutions vulnerable to exogenous criticism. Consequently, he urged
caution:
Twenty-two amicus briefs have been  led in this case,
and indeed the Court’s opinion contains no fewer than
37 citations to amicus briefs and other secondary sources.
The various briefs  led in this case are markedly different
from typical briefs, in that large parts of them do not deal
with decided cases or statutory language — the sort of
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material we customarily interpret. Instead they deal with
de nitions of scienti c knowledge, scienti c method, scienti c validity, and peer review — in short, matters far
a eld from the expertise of judges. This is not to say that
such materials are not useful or even necessary in deciding how Rule 702 should be applied; but it is easy to say
that the usual subject matter should cause us to proceed
with great caution in deciding more than we have to,
because our reach can so easily exceed our grasp.11
Accepting that trial judges would need to assume some kind of
“gatekeeping responsibility,” Rehnquist CJ indicated that they should not
be required to become “amateur scientists” or philosophers of science.
The Chief Justice entertained serious doubts about the value of falsi cation as a legal standard.
I defer to no one in my con dence in federal judges; but I
am at a loss to know what is meant when it is said that
the scienti c status of a theory depends on its
“falsi ability,” and I suspect some of them will be too.12
Implying that the majority position raised more questions than answers,
Rehnquist CJ wondered whether the criteria (especially falsi cation) would
apply to expert opinion evidence tendered under the remaining (nonscienti c) elements of the Rule 702 formulation: “technical and other
specialized knowledge.”
Before proceeding, we should acknowledge that Blackmun J had also
quali ed the majority position and its reliance on secondary authority,
through emphasizing differences between monolithic images of law and
science.13
There are important differences between the quest for
truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scienti c conclusions are subject to perpetual
revisions. Law, on the other hand, must resolve disputes
 nally and quickly . . . That, nevertheless, is the balance
that is struck by Rules of Evidence designed not for the
exhaustive search for cosmic understanding but for the
particularized resolution of legal disputes.14
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In practice, Rehnquist CJ’s reticence and Blackmun J’s quali cations both
serve to sustain legal legitimacy while mediating potential criticism from
outside the legal establishment.15 Rehnquist CJ’s reluctance to engage
with the secondary literature operates as a legal prophylactic and Blackmun
J’s quali ed incorporation as a form of legal inoculation.
Justice Blackmun’s cosmological caveat — that at times courts may
admit evidence that is in some ways less than scienti c but still useful and
suf ciently reliable — helps to create space for interpretive  exibility in the
deployment of falsi cation. The idea that there is a clear distinction
between exhaustive searches for cosmic understanding as opposed to the
particularized resolutions of legal disputes, exploits a dichotomy which
contradicts the broader rationale underpinning the majority Daubert
judgment. Implicitly, warrant for the particularized resolution of legal
disputes is reliant on reference to and conformity with “cosmic” scienti c
understanding; otherwise there would be little need for the level of concern displayed in Daubert with scienti c methodology. In such circumstances, the admissibility of scienti c claims could be evaluated against
more pragmatic considerations. The cosmological caveat hints at the
polysemous nature of scienti c method doctrines.16 Falsi cation could be
used to demarcate — in a non-pejorative capacity — when expert evidence was not science, such as in the case of technical or specialized
knowledge, but representations could also be more pejorative when the
evidence was deemed “bad” or “junk” science. Flexibility in the classi cation and description of expert opinion evidence offered trial judges considerable discretion.17 As we shall see, the  exible extension of testing to
all expert opinion evidence in subsequent jurisprudence limited the signi cance of such formal boundaries.
The model(s) of science and assortment of authorities associated with
the Daubert criteria are revealing. It would be inappropriate to describe
the positions of the philosophers, sociologists and historians cited in
Daubert as consistent or even reconcilable. 18 The approaches to science
developed by Popper (1902–94) and Hempel (1905–97) represent different traditions within the philosophy of science and could not be considered to be representative of the numerous approaches to the sciences
found in historical or contemporary studies of science or even in the
pronouncements of scientists.19 If we accept that attempts at fair representation might be dif cult, controversial and are not the primary aim of
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judges, a more rewarding approach is to inquire about the reasons for the
appearance of speci c philosophers and sociologists of science and selections from their works, and the particular con gurations of science that
were developed in Daubert and the judgment.s which followed it. In
attempting to pursue this mode of inquiry it is our contention that
through the quite deliberate emphasis on falsi cation/testing the Court
sought to inaugurate not only a more consistent — the putative reason
for granting certiorari — but a more onerous approach to admissibility
decision making within the federal courts.20 We recognize, in adopting
such an orientation, that many other descriptions of the sciences were
available. 21
Despite a few quali cations pertaining to peer review and publication, drawn from Jasanoff, Ziman, Horrobin, Angel and Relman (cited
above), the Daubert criteria were intentionally focused on testing —
particularly whether an opinion had actually been tested — and the
(positive) existence of published materials.22 This reading tends to be
supported in Rehnquist CJ’s dissent, where he wonders about the judicial
response to falsi cation, and in judgments after Daubert where judges
endeavoring to apply its doctrine have drawn most conspicuously on the
positive aspects such as whether scienti c (and other) knowledge claims
have been literally tested and whether experts had previously published their
opinions.23 Indeed, in the following section we will consider how the
Court of Appeals dealing with Daubert on remand modi ed the publication and peer review criteria to incorporate a test sensitive to the motivations guiding scienti c inquiry. In the overwhelming majority of appeals,
Daubert’s quali cations to peer review and publication, drawn from (without endorsing) the constructivist approach of Jasanoff and others, are not
only elided, but the subsequent preoccupation with and stigmatization of
“science for litigation” sit very awkwardly against Jasanoff ’s published
work.24 It is perhaps not surprising to  nd Popper cited more often, and
peer review and publication used routinely in decision making without
reference to the quali cations and theoretical assumptions underpinning
the writings of Jasanoff and others.
The philosophy of science developed by Popper (and others who
appeared in the Daubert judgment such as Hempel and Jasanoff et al) was
not in any simple way determinative of the models of science ultimately
promoted in the judgments that cited it. Indeed Popper’s philosophy of
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science was invariably described (or summarized) in a most cursory and
rudimentary manner. Rather than represent the sudden appearance of
Popper (and the others) as an attempt to engage with or accommodate the
history, philosophy and sociology of science, judicial reference to such
work seems to operate as synecdoche for an implicitly proper and comprehensive representation of science and its processes. 25 Invoking Popper and
others in order to articulate a new vision of (what is consistently presented
as good) science for legal settings was a deliberate response to anxieties
about the prevalence of questionable expertise and gratuitous lawsuits in
US courts. The new rigor endorsed by Daubert simultaneously promulgated judicial “gatekeeping”; supplanting “screening” as the appropriate
metaphor through which to conceptualize admissibility decision making.
Toward the end of this paper we will return to a more theoretical
discussion of the sudden and relatively infrequent appearance of the
history, philosophy and sociology of science in US federal courts. In the
interim our trajectory will incorporate a range of cases intended to inform
our assessment of the uses of Popper by providing the reader with a broad
sample for comparative purposes. Our  rst step is to consider how Popper
fares after his apotheosis in the Daubert decision.

3. Post-Daubert and Kumho: The Sublimation of Popper
It might not be surprising to  nd that in the wake of Daubert federal
courts adopted a variety of responses to expert opinion evidence and the
authority of historians, sociologists and philosophers supporting it. The
following examples are intended to provide some sense of approaches and
adaptations; they include: bare citation — Daubert as precedent; modi cation and extension, leading to differentiation; and  nally, in Kumho, another
appeal to the Supreme Court, the sublimation of Popper as testing became
a self-supporting legal test potentially applicable to all expert opinion
evidence. With the exception of Kumho all of the cases cited below draw
upon not only Daubert but also some of the secondary sources cited in
Daubert.
Of all the secondary authors referred to in the enunciation of the
Daubert criteria, Popper is the most frequently cited. Most of the judgments citing Popper seem to serve the purpose of articulating the standard
to be used by judges in making admissibility decisions after Daubert. So,
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for example, City of Tuscaloosa v Harcross Chemicals, Inc., is typical of what
might be described as a bare or straight citation. In commenting on the
statistical and econometric analyses of the plaintiff ’s expert, Judge Guin
quoted the  rst criteria from the Daubert judgment as the mechanism
necessitating the exclusion of the expert evidence:
Ordinarily, a key question to be answered in determining
whether a theory or technique is scienti c knowledge
that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be
(and has been) tested. “Scienti c methodology today is
based on generating hypotheses and testing them to see if
they can be falsi ed; indeed, this methodology is what
distinguishes science from other  elds of human inquiry.”
Green 645. See also C. Hempel, Philosophy of Natural
Science 49 (1966) (“[T]he statements constituting a scienti c explanation must be capable of empirical test”); K.
Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scienti c Knowledge 37 (5th ed. 1989) (“[T]he criterion of the
scienti c status of a theory is its falsi ability, or refutability,
or testability”).26
The applicability of falsi cation to non-scienti c evidence and the active
attempts to demarcate the boundaries around what constituted science
were emerging areas of inconsistency among the federal circuits.27 Notwithstanding these issues, the doctrine of testability enabled (rather than
required) the trial judge to exclude the plaintiff ’s evidence on the basis
that it was insuf ciently reliable. 28
In the case of US v. Havvard, Judge Hamilton drew upon Daubert’s
reference to Hempel and Popper in support of the State’s contention that
latent  ngerprinting represented a legitimate scienti c activity. In relation
to  ngerprints:
That claim of uniqueness and permanence is a scienti c
claim in the sense that it can be falsi ed. Such falsi ability
is the hallmark of a scienti c claim. See Daubert, . . .29
Other judges cited Popper and Hempel (and others) to support propositions that are more relevant to probabilistic laws and physical mechanisms
than falsi cation. Though, we should note that Popper and Hempel are
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merely reappearing after their Supreme Court debut. As part of a long
string footnote they really add very little to the analysis, aside from
implicit support for the particular proposition or as precedent, (apparent)
judicial erudition and the need to test some types of knowledge before
admitting them into the courtroom.30
Although it was not the  rst court to deal with the implications of the
1993 Daubert judgment., in 1995 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered Daubert on remand from the Supreme Court. That judgment
provides an impression of how subsequent Courts were confronted —
here explicitly daunted — with the expectations outlined in the original
Supreme Court majority decision.
Our responsibility, then, unless we badly misread the
Supreme Court’s [Daubert] opinion, is to resolve disputes
among respected, well-credentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in areas where there is
no scienti c consensus as to what is and what is not
“good science,” and occasionally to reject such expert
testimony because it was not “derived by the scienti c
method.” Mindful of our position in the hierarchy of the
federal judiciary, we take a deep breath and proceed with
this heady task.31
In undertaking their “heady task,” the Court of Appeals introduced
supplementary criteria — modi cation and extension of Daubert —
drawn from the in ammatory, yet highly in uential work of Peter Huber.32
Notwithstanding Huber’s apparent sympathy for a folk version of Popper’s
philosophy, much of his interest in the participation of expert witnesses
seems to be acutely sensitive to their motivations and orientations. Such
views — arguably concerns to which Popper, via falsi cation, was generally indifferent and concerns that are dif cult to reconcile with the provision of a strict role for method or testability — are conspicuous in the
judgment.33
. . . we may not ignore the fact that a scientist’s normal
workplace is the lab or the  eld, not the courtroom or the
lawyer’s of ce.
That an expert testi es based on research he has
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conducted independent of the litigation provides important, objective proof that the research comports with the
dictates of good science. See Peter W. Huber, Galileo’s
Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom 206–209 (1991). 34
Dif culties associated with the application of falsi cation as a meaningful
demarcation criterion, especially in (mass tort) cases like Daubert which
involved epidemiological evidence and complex assessments of causal
relations, meant that judges occasionally developed additional criteria
such as the pejorative appellation “science for litigation” and tended to
rely upon the non-problematized — that is, non-constructivist — implications of publication. In the same judgment, Huber is also cited as
authority for the importance of subjecting expert conclusions to normal
scienti c scrutiny through peer review and publication. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals accepted that the Daubert criteria constituted good
science. Nevertheless, they incorporated supplementary considerations,
such as the purpose of inquiry and the motivations of scientists, to assist
with their determinations. Daubert provides the general framework, though
none of the secondary authors are cited. Only Huber’s polemical text
Galileo’s Revenge, which rails against the purported dangers posed by the
prevalence of “junk science” in US courts, is cited in support of these
particular images of science.
It is unremarkable to encounter judges drawing upon the authority of
higher courts in their endeavors to explain and justify their own decisions.
However, the next two examples provide some limited indication of
judicial recognition of the existence of disagreements among historians
and philosophers of science — as well as lawyers and judges — over the
value of Popper’s philosophy. In the  rst example, US v. Director of Ill.
Dept of Corrections, Zagel J (who we will meet again) drew upon the work
of prominent evidence scholar Ron Allen to help introduce and
contextualize the discussion of the history, philosophy and sociology of
science. 35 In this respect Zagel’s J approach resembled Daubert where
Popper and Hempel were introduced into the judgment through the
work of legal commentator Michael Green.
Under Daubert, I am to consider, roughly stated, whether
a scienti c theory can be (and has been) tested,9 . . .
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9. Professor Allen disapproves of this test as an
anachronism based on the philosophy of science
of Karl Popper. He thinks Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy is better. If I had to choose between
Popper and Kuhn, I would pick Popper despite
his  aws and so would nearly all scientists. I also
 nd value in the work of the man who taught me
logic. See Dudley Shapere, Reason and Its Search
for Knowledge (1979). But the point may not
have much practical consequence. The science in
most courtrooms does not vary with what Kuhn
would think of as a prevailing paradigm. The
physics we use in courtrooms often operates on
principles understood by the Egyptians, and we
seldom have to concern ourselves with anything
beyond Newton’s physics, though it is possible
that we may have to deal someday with black
body radiation or the constant speed of light. In
any event I do not understand Kuhn to take the
position that the testing of hypotheses is anything other than a good idea, it is, in part, the
impossibility of vigorous implementation of that
principle that troubled Kuhn. Compare Karl Popper, Objective Knowledge: An Evolutionary Approach (1972) with Kuhn, The Structure of Scienti c Revolutions (1970). 36
Ultimately, Zagel J preferred Popper “despite his  aws” to Kuhn. Notwithstanding the recognition of alternative approaches and apparent weaknesses or limitations to the philosophy of Popper, Zagel J embraced
Popper and effectively ignored any of their implications. Instead, Zagel J
pondered whether the application of Daubert to non-organic psychiatric
evidence might require “a wholesale reevaluation of the admissibility of
this form of opinion evidence given the absence of testability.”37 Sensibly,
Zagel J left that question for another day.
The practice of acknowledging a variety of history, philosophy and
sociology of science perspectives which are subsequently ignored or
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trivialized in favour of simplistic interpretations of testing or peer review is
widespread among legal commentators and judges. The tendency to “inoculate” — admitting a little evil to prevent a greater one — is a pronounced feature of Foster and Huber’s in uential text: Judging Science.38
Judging Science purports to provide a de nitive reading of the implications
of Daubert and is designed to serve as a de-facto judicial guide for the legal
interpretation of the reliability of scienti c evidence. Notwithstanding
some eclectic recognition of limits to the work of Popper and others,
ultimately falsi cation is presented as the best legal solution to admissibility and suf ciency problems on the highly contentious basis that it provides
the closest approximation to actual scienti c practice.39
Similarly, recognition of criticisms of Popper in US v. Hines appears
to have little impact on the application of the Daubert criteria.40 Judge
Gertner drew upon Rehnquist CJ’s dissent, legal commentaries (by Capron,
Farrell and Schuck) and, like Zagel J, the work of Kuhn as part of a corpus
of critical authority.41 Having enumerated the four criteria and emphasized their  exible application, Gertner J produced the following footnote:
FN7. The Court’s approach — the extent to which it
adopted the premises of science, notwithstanding its attention to the differences between the laboratory and the
courtroom — has been subject to criticism. Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for example, suggested that the majority should
have given the lower courts the task, not of determining
scienti c validity, but of developing, on a case-by-case
basis, a jurisprudence of science — a set of legal principles for using science’s truth in the interest of justice.
See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600–01, 113 S.Ct. 2786
(Rehnquist, J., concurring/dissenting); see also, Farrell,
supra. Others have suggested that the Court had simply
taken the de nition of science from Karl Popper, a de nition that others have criticized as deriving from a culturally de ned, time-bound paradigm. See Daubert, 509
U.S. at 593, 113 S.Ct. 2786 (quoting Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scienti c Knowledge, 37 (5th ed.1989)); Capron, supra at 23; Farrell,
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supra at 2195, 2205; Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of
Scienti c Revolutions 17–20 (2d ed.1970). 42
The criteria from Daubert provided the judge with not only material legal
resources (authority) but a more restrictive regime to support rigorous
standards and the more quali ed use of a once relied upon (rather than
“reliable”) form of expertise.43 The Daubert regime was changing the
manner in which judges were to interpret and understand expert opinion
evidence. The case of Hines was decided after Strarzecpyzel and Kumho,
which are discussed immediately below. We have included it at this
juncture because in determining the admissibility of handwriting expertise, the judge alluded to theoretical differences between Popper and
others; notwithstanding that there is no discernible effect on the decision.
This brings us to the issue — confronting judges in cases like Hines
— of whether Daubert applied to all expert opinion evidence, or just
scienti c evidence. We have already seen how part of Rehnquist CJ’s
disquiet in Daubert emerged from concern with interpretation of “scienti c, technical and other specialized knowledge” from Rule 702. Interest
in the interpretation of the phrase was encouraged by Rehnquist CJ’s own
concerns, espoused in Daubert, which created both a source of semantic
instability and authority (obiter dicta) as well as the fact that in general
Daubert presaged a more restrictive approach to expert evidence among
the federal courts. Without intending to promote a deterministic approach or attribute essentialised meanings and uses, the combination of
falsi cation being originally designed as a boundary-de ning criteria, the
exclusionary response adopted among the federal courts after Daubert and
the actual text of Rule 702, encouraged many plaintiffs (really their wily
lawyers) to attempt to restrict the more austere Daubert approach to the
“scienti c” domain and have their expert evidence admitted as “technical
or specialized knowledge.” In the armoury of judicial gatekeepers Popper
— in the guise of testing — was proving to be a formidable weapon.
The case of US v Starzecpyzel serves as an example of how criminal
defendants sought to have forensic document examination evidence excluded on the basis that it did not meet the Daubert criteria — especially
the rigours of falsi cation — and how the trial judge resisted that application on the basis of a restricted reading of Daubert where falsi cation
applied only to scienti c evidence. 44
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The Daubert Court derives the gatekeeping task of the
trial judge from a reevaluation of Frye (itself limited to
scienti c testimony) and from consideration of the word
“scienti c” in Rule 702. The essence of Daubert’s “reliability” standard lies within the Court’s citation to philosopher of science Karl Popper’s statement that “the criterion of the scienti c status of a theory is its falsi ability, or
refutability, or testability.” — U.S. — at — , 113 S.Ct.
at 2797 (quoting Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scienti c Knowledge 37 (5th ed.
1989). 45
For Judge McKenna, the Daubert criteria applied only to scienti c evidence. The judgment provides an indication of active judicial management of legal reliability through the demarcation of science from nonscience. By characterizing document examination as non-scienti c, but
not pseudo-science or junk science, McKenna J was able to admit the
State’s evidence. Similar distinctions were raised in Moore v. Ashland
Chemical, Inc. where the exclusion of a medical expert’s opinion was
reversed and remanded on the basis that Daubert applied only to hard
science and not to medical testimony: “The methodology of hard or
Newtonian science is what distinguishes it from other  elds of human
inquiry.”46 The examples of Starzecpyzel and Moore provide some indication of the  exibility associated with Daubert; however, in general Daubert
propagated an exclusionary ethos among the federal courts.
In terms of the analysis to follow, it is important to refer to the
existence of Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Patrick Carmichael, another appeal to
the US Supreme Court, notwithstanding that it features no direct reference to the philosophical, historical or sociological literature relied upon
in Daubert.47 In effect the issue to be resolved in Kumho, again  owing
from inconsistency among the federal circuits (as indicated by City of
Tuscaloosa, Starzecpyzel and Moore), was: Did the Daubert criteria apply to
expert opinion evidence of a non-scienti c nature, here engineering?
While the Court did not refer to any literature that could be remotely
characterized as the history, philosophy or sociology of science or technology, the case is interesting for a number of reasons that we intend to draw
together. For the moment, we intend to identify four features of the
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Kumho judgment. First, the Court emphatically declared that trial judges
may use some or all of the Daubert criteria.
. . . we conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding in a particular case how to go
about determining whether particular expert testimony is
reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider the
speci c factors identi ed in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of expert testimony.48
This approach reinforced the earlier position, established in Joiner, about
the abuse-of-discretion standard for judicial review of the trial judge’s
admissibility decisions.49 Second, in line with much of the post-Daubert
jurisprudence the judgment is littered with references to the trial judge’s
gatekeeping obligation and even a gatekeeping requirement.50 The gatekeeping
obligation re ects the expectations placed upon trial judges in Daubert
and con rmed in Joiner. Third, notwithstanding the emphasis on the
exible application of the Daubert criteria, the majority actually applied
them all — emphasizing testing — in their assessment of the expert’s
evidence. 51 The opinion evidence of an engineer (Carlson) with a masters
degree from Georgia Tech was excluded from the court. 52 And  nally,
Daubert’s earlier con dence in American juries and cross-examination was
effaced. Instead, the trial judge was invested with what appears to be a
more paternalistic obligation to assist the jury by only admitting reliable
and relevant expert opinion evidence.
The trial judge’s effort to assure that the specialized testimony is reliable and relevant can help the jury evaluate
that foreign experience, whether the testimony re ects
scienti c, technical or other specialized knowledge. 53
The questionable link between Popper’s formulation, as well as the other
criteria, and reliable evidence or its relationship to non-scienti c forms of
knowledge and practice is subtly elided. If the dominant Supreme Court
articulations of Popper raise the standard for admissibility determinations
then the politics around particular representations of reliability and the
relevance of Popper and testing tend to be obscured.
Within a decade of Daubert, the “gatekeeping” role of the trial judge
was authoritatively reinforced. In making Rule 702 admissibility determi-
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nations the trial judge may apply the Daubert criteria to any type of expert
opinion evidence. Unlike the Daubert judgment, in Kumho the majority
decision actually undertakes or exempli es the application of the criteria
in the actual case before it. Applying all of the Daubert criteria to the
plaintiffs’ expert opinion evidence the majority excluded the expert’s
(Carlson) opinion and thereby the plaintiffs’ case. In Kumho the Supreme
Court expressed anxieties about jury competence, the existence of “expertise that is fausse and science that is junky,” and reiterated the need for
judicial vigilance in the guise of gatekeeping.
In Daubert a version of Popper’s philosophy was translated (transmuted) into law. After Kumho only Popper’s (legal) ghost remains to
haunt plaintiffs — and to a lesser extent crime enforcement agencies. In a
relatively brief period the earlier legal apotheosis of Popper and a large
number of written judgments enabled the Supreme Court to draw upon
considerable legal authority for its extension of the criteria to non-scienti c forms of expert evidence in Kumho. Reference to Popper and the
other commentators and especially the quali cations to peer review and
publication could be displaced.54 Numerous references to Daubert and the
new doctrine of testing, rather than reference to arcane philosophical
foundations, facilitates judicial legitimation without unnecessary philosophical engagement. The sublimation of Popper (and others) also operates to insulate legal institutions from external criticism. Now, more than
ever, testing and the other criteria are ostensibly legal categories, and, as
we have seen, in applying them judges can evade criticism of the adequacy
of their epistemology — the so-called cosmic understanding quali cation
— on the basis that they are merely applying law in the routine administration of justice. The discretion invested in trial judges is belied by the
Supreme Court’s own rigorous application of all the criteria to the expert
opinion evidence of Carlson as a very public lesson about the risks
associated with “junk” science.
It is our intention to draw some of these cases and their references to
the history and philosophy and sociology of science together, after a brief
examination of the role played by Popper’s philosophy in some earlier
creation science litigation and the invocation of other historians and
sociologists in recent decades.
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4. Creation science in McLean v Arkansas:
Popper and the Establishment Clause
Despite Popper’s (historical) standing among philosophers of science
and his invocation by the Supreme Court in Daubert, surprisingly there
are very few references to either Popper or falsi cation in federal court
judgments prior to the 1990s. The question — Why does Popper suddenly feature in judicial discourse in 1993? — is one to which we intend
to return. However, some indication of the reasons for Popper’s exhumation (and celebration) might be gleaned by reference to the circumstances
associated with an earlier appearance.
It is no coincidence that an earlier incarnation of Popperian philosophy of science was invoked to deal with another type of pernicious “junk”
science, namely creation science. In McLean v Arkansas, Judge Overton
was confronted with the issue of whether an Arkansan statute prescribing
equal time to the teaching of creation science and evolution violated the
First Amendment prohibition against establishment of religion.55 In answering this question, Overton J, assisted by the testimony of expert
witnesses, developed a de nition of science which excluded creation science, thereby characterizing creation science as part of a religion and
making its state-sponsored teaching unconstitutional.56
Endeavouring to explain this decision Overton J articulated what he
described as a “precise” de nition of science:
. . . the essential characteristics of science are:
(1) It is guided by natural law;
(2) It has to be explanatory by reference to natural law;
(3) It is testable against the empirical world;
(4) Its conclusions are tentative, i.e., are not necessarily
the  nal word; and
(5) It is falsi able. (Ruse and other science witnesses).57
Later Overton J drew upon publication and peer review as a further
indication that creation science fails to meet the more general descriptions
of “‘what scientists think’ and ‘what scientists do.’”58
This particular de nition of science, admittedly developed in a separate context to the test espoused in Daubert, is discernably different. 59
Accepting that the Daubert judgment is concerned with explaining the
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admissibility standard for expert opinion evidence under Rule 702 of the
FRE, nevertheless that decision dedicates very limited attention to the
idea of natural law or naturalistic explanation (1) and (2), and makes no
attempt to distinguish between testability (3) and falsi ability (5).60 In
attempting to distinguish law from science, Blackmun J shared Overton
J’s contention that scienti c conclusions are tentative (4). Juxtaposed,
McLean and Daubert might be used to suggest that de nitions of science
are developed strategically; sensitive to context. Notwithstanding several
similarities, the representations of science developed in McLean and Daubert
are different and are designed to perform different types of work. In
McLean, scienti c, philosophical and judicial recourse to falsi cation, in
conjunction with an emphasis on natural law, is invoked to exclude
creation science from the realm of proper science.
The contention that recourse to Popper’s falsi cation is merely one of
a number of strategic resources is reinforced by several other considerations. We will brie y consider two. First, amicus curiae briefs submitted
in Daubert tend to provide a range of different models of science, of
which many could not be classed as Popperian, and like Daubert tend not
to discuss natural law in any detail. Second, the strategic and instrumental
use of the history, philosophy and sociology of science (and other  elds) is
also supported in other pre-Daubert cases discussing the nature of science
where neither Popper nor falsi cation receive any consideration.
Before falsi cation/testing became the preferred criterion in the Supreme Court through Daubert and Kumho, federal judges drew upon
other sources of authority for insight and legitimacy and to display their
erudition.61 The 1991 decision in Mercado v. Ahmed provides an informative example.62 Accepting that the case is unusual in its liberal use of
secondary sources — philosophers, anthropologists, historians and political scientists such as Quine, Gadamer, Geertz, Kuhn and Wildavsky — it
does provide evidence of (judicially recognised) alternative approaches to
understanding the nature of science. To a Daubert sensitised audience, the
case is conspicuous because Popper and falsi cation are both missing.
Endeavouring to justify the exclusion of the evidence of an economist “on
the cash value of the lost pleasure of life,” Judge Zagel’s meander through
the secondary sources suggests that veri cation through the accuracy of
prediction was the preferred answer to the problem of evidentiary reliabil-
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ity and admissibility both inside the courtroom and beyond. Referring to
the writings of Quine and Gadamer, Zagel J found that:
This reliance upon prediction as validation comes from
the positivist tradition in philosophy. This is today the
accepted method for deciding what is science, what is
scienti cally known. But it may not be a comprehensive
standard for all belief and knowledge. 63
Rather than claiming that Zagel J was wrong or that the nature of science
changed in the intervening two years (before Daubert, 1993), the example
reinforces our contention that images of science developed in separate
legal contexts can be substantially different and that such differences may
be understood as signi cant, for us purposive.64
Another pre-Daubert appeal discussing scienti c evidence and method,
again without mentioning Popper, is the Bendectin case of Brock v Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.65 In that case Kuhn’s criticisms of the existence
of a trans-historical scienti c method are footnoted. The Brock appeal was
subsequently cited in Daubert, but not for its insights on science. 66
To some degree in McLean and more conspicuously in Mercado and
Brock, federal judges produced de nitions of science, also drawing upon
scienti c, philosophical, historical and sociological support, that simply
do not conform with the  exible criteria promoted in Daubert. The
majority judgment in Daubert makes no attempt to deal with those cases
or respond to a number of heterogeneous  elds and debates about the
nature of science continuing long after the publication of Popper’s most
in uential works. The questions of whether the sciences are meaningfully
uni ed, or falsi cation reconcilable with the other three criteria, and the
value of non-Popperian philosophies of science are controversial issues
which are simply not addressed.
Consequently, it would seem that the judicial preference for falsi cation and testing, attributed to Popper in Daubert, was not the only
possible approach nor an entirely neutral ascription. Before,  nally, embarking on a more politically sensitive analysis of these cases we shall
brie y consider the appearance of several other scholarly works, particularly by sociologists of science, in the federal courts in the course of the
last three decades.
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5. (in)Signicant others: Robert K. Merton,
Bruno Latour and Sheila Jasanoff
So far we have concentrated on some of the most conspicuous appropriations associated with the Daubert regime. Through our  nal selection
we will examine several examples of more isolated (or discrete) references
to literature from the history, philosophy or sociology of science. These
examples serve to support the particularized application of the law and
normative images of science rather than to assist in the production of a
legal standard as in Daubert. In this sense they are more characteristically
factual and normative. The manifestations are also more sporadic and
sensitive to the description and rationalization of speci c cases. This leads
to representations (and uses) which might, occasionally, appear inconsistent with a range of more familiar images of the sciences and scienti c
practice.
Most of the following cases refer to writings by Robert K. Merton.67
Merton  rst published in the 1930s and is widely acknowledged as one of
the founders of the sociology of science, particularly its North American
incarnation. He made important contributions to developing links between the history of science and the sociology of knowledge, articulated
an in uential model of the ideal normative structure of the scienti c
community and helped develop a variety of methodological tools to
examine the structure of scienti c communities, such as through the
analysis of scienti c biographies.68 Merton’s work continues to exert some
in uence over the sociology of science, although over the last twenty
years, in the wake of post-Kuhnian developments, his functionalist in uenced approach has waned.69 The last two examples refer to work by
Bruno Latour and Sheila Jasanoff. Latour and Jasanoff are two of the best
known  gures in contemporary science studies. Latour has written a
number of in uential and provocative texts including works which helped
inaugurate ethnographic studies of scienti c laboratories and actor network theory. Apart from providing a rich repository of metaphors to
explain the politics of science and technology this work has also displayed
considerable theoretical novelty. “Actor network theory,” for instance,
challenges the use of traditional epistemological dichotomies in the social
sciences — such as structure and agency and natural versus social —
especially when considering technology and social change. Latour is Professor at the Center for the Study of Innovation at the School of Mines,
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Paris. Jasanoff has published numerous books and articles on U.S. regulatory culture, risk assessment and (re ecting her earlier professional training in law), science and law. She was the long-standing head of the
Science & Technology Studies Department at Cornell University and
recently took a personal chair in politics at the J.F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University. Despite the broader relevance of Latour
and in particular Jasanoff, to matters involving law and science, both are
cited only in a rather perfunctory manner as part of spirited dissenting
judgments.
The  rst example, Kewanee Oil Company v. Bicron Corporation, was
an appeal to the US Supreme Court. 70 On the question of whether state
trade secret law was preempted by the federal patent laws a majority of the
court indicated that as long as it did not trespass on the purpose of the
Constitutionally-based legislative scheme enacted by Congress, the state
law could co-exist. Outlining the reasons for these protections, Chief
Justice Burger explained that trade secret law protected individuals and
companies that had expended efforts in domains that were not patentable. Patenting was designed to encourage investment and industry whilst
providing years of protection to the patent owner. In the words of Jefferson,
some things “are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive
patent.”71 In theory, patents encouraged the public dissemination of ideas,
while protecting the interests and efforts of the owner. Whereas patent
protection tended to act as a barrier to prevent people using the technique, procedure or process, the trade secret law protected items that
would not be proper subjects for consideration for patent protection and
operated more like a sieve. Trade secret law tended to provide far weaker
protection than the patent law. So the fact that some might prefer the
more limited protection afforded by trade secrets law to patent, was not
considered suf ciently signi cant to interfere with the state’s legislative
initiative. Burger CJ acknowledged that the more limited protections
provided by the trade secrecy laws allowed — actually could stimulate —
competitors to attempt to copy or approximate through “fair and honest
means” such as reverse engineering. It was in this context that Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the majority, drew on the work of Merton and
others to support his contention that conferring secrecy on a limited
selection of techniques would not signi cantly retard industry and national development.
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Nor does society face much risk that scienti c or technological progress will be impeded by the rare inventor with
a patentable invention who chooses trade secret protection over patent protection. The ripeness-of-time concept of invention, developed from the study of the many
independent multiple discoveries in history predicts that
if a particular individual had not made a particular discovery others would have, and in probably a relatively
short period of time. If something is to be discovered at
all very likely it will be discovered by more than one
person. Singletons and Multiples in Science (1961), in R.
Merton, The Sociology of Science 343 (1973); J. Cole & S.
Cole, Social Strati cation in Science 12–13, 229–230
(1973); Ogburn & Thomas, Are Inventions Inevitable?,
37 Pol.Sci.Q. 83 (1922). 19
19. See J. Watson, The Double Helix (1968). If
Watson and Crick had not discovered the structure of DNA it is likely that Linus Pauling would
have made the discovery soon. Other examples of
multiple discovery are listed in the Ogburn and
Thomas article.72
For Burger CJ, the trade secret law offered many bene cial effects. It
might be considered ironic that Merton, perhaps best known for his
discussion of scienti c norms, including the norms of openness and
communalism, would be cited as support for the proposition that keeping
some knowledges secret in order to reward research efforts and to stimulate industry might not retard scienti c progress. 73
A more conventional approach to the work of Merton is apparent in
Forsham v. Califano.74 Forsham was a case concerned with access to raw
data from federally-sponsored scienti c research under the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA). Bazelon’s J dissent refers to Merton’s normative
scienti c ethos in order to criticize the majority judgment. Bazelon J drew
on both the purpose of the FOIA and the standards of the scienti c
community, as espoused by Merton, to support his position:
The essence of the scienti c community, I had thought,
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is the commitment to the advancement of scienti c truth
by subjecting  ndings and conclusions to the “exacting
scrutiny of fellow experts.”25 Moreover, where scienti c
data bear the earmarks of agency “records” subject to
FOIA, it would be the height of irony to deny disclosure
on the ground that it could expose errors or frauds and
thereby discourage those who do the work of the Government. FOIA was enacted in part to end the practice of
withholding information “only to cover up embarrassing
mistakes or irregularities . . .”
25. R. Merton, The Sociology of Science 275
(1973); see also B. Barber, Science and the Social
Order 89 (1952). 75
The third case, Joel Blaz v. Michael Reese Hospital Foundation, involved a motion to dismiss a civil action on the basis of the reach of the
duty of care owed by a hospital-based research scientist studying the
effects on former patients of radiation treatment in a Chicago hospital.76
In undertaking the study and applying for research funding from the
National Institutes for Health, a research scientist responsible for the
Thyroid Follow-Up Program indicated that a study based on the Program
showed “strong evidence” between the earlier treatment and various sorts
of tumor. However, attempts to survey and inform patients were more
circumspect. A questionnaire sent to former patients suggested that it was
merely part of a follow-up study “to determine the possible associated
risks.” 77 The question for determination was whether the research scientist, who was not the treating physician, and the hospital owed a duty of
care to warn the hospital’s former patients about the risk of future tumors
on the basis of the research results.
Acknowledging a responsibility, consistent with Illinois law, to interpret the extent of any duty carefully, District Judge Bucklo suggested that
he could identify few reasons to exclude the researcher from a duty.
Bucklo J found that even though the research scientist was not the
treating physician, relative to the plaintiff he was in a special position to
acquire relevant information and that hospitals and doctors maintained
obligations to former patients. In assessing whether there were any policy
reasons for limiting the extent of duty Judge Bucklo considered whether
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constructing such a duty would inhibit research into the effects of medical
treatment by non-treating physicians. Bucklo J continued:
But this does not strike me as a real worry. First, the duty
would be discharged by a mere warning which, as explained, would here have been neither costly nor burdensome to give. The more costly and burdensome the warning would be to give, of course, the less likely there would
be a  nding of duty. Second, the medical researchers’
legitimate desire for professional prestige and honor due
to new discoveries, see generally Robert K. Merton, The
Sociology of Science (1973), would counteract any such
inhibition; as of course would the concern for the wellbeing of its former patients which any self-respecting
hospitals would have.78
In these three examples quite different views of the role of secrecy and
open communication of scienti c  ndings are being bolstered by citing
Merton’s characterizations of the ethos and structure of the scienti c
community. Like the uses of Popper identi ed previously, it is not our
contention that this merely displays judicial ignorance or inadequate
understanding of the meaning of secondary (non-legal) sources. Rather it
implies a different kind of understanding: an understanding of the value
of such citations and representations as strategic resources tailored to the
demands of decision making in the speci c case and, for courts of appeal,
beyond.
The next example, American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., was an
appeal in a copyright infringement action against Texaco.79 The publishers
of scienti c journals alleged that unauthorised reproduction of copyright
protected articles by Texaco scientists and engineers was inconsistent with
“fair use.” We are concerned with the dissenting judgment of Judge
Jacobs. Unlike the majority, Jacobs J determined that photocopying of
articles in order to assemble a personal “archive” was within the realm of
“fair use.” In a passionate dissenting judgment, it is perhaps not surprising
to  nd Jacobs J drawing on work by sociologists and historians of science
to support an alternative understanding of the nature of science. Expressing a preference for a broad model of research — “In my view, the
research function is far broader than the majority opinion and the district
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court opinion contemplate” — Jacobs J suggested that the practice of
science extended beyond the laboratory experiment. 80
The scienti c method, properly conceived, is much more
than a system of repeated laboratory experimentation.
Rather, it is a dynamic process of “planned cooperation
of scientists, each of whom uses and continues the investigations of his predecessors . . .” Edgar Zilsel, “The
Sociological Roots of Science,” in Hugh F. Kearney, ed.
Origins of the Scienti c Revolution, 97 (1968). 81
In particular, as part of the argument Jacobs J referred to the work of
Latour and Woolgar to support the preferred image of research and to
emphasise the importance of photocopying to the routine practice of
science.
The anthropologist Bruno Latour spent two years studying scientists at the Salk Institute for Biological Sciences.
During the course of his study, he conducted anthropological observations of a neurobiologist working on an
article for a journal. This scientist’s desk was littered with
copies of journal articles authored by other scientists:
Xeroxed copies of articles, with words underlined
and exclamation marks in the margins, are everywhere. Drafts of articles in preparation intermingle
with diagrams scribbled on scrap paper, letters
from colleagues and reams of paper spewed out
by the computer in the next room; pages cut
from articles are glued to other pages; excerpts
from draft paragraphs change hands between colleagues while more advanced drafts pass from
of ce to of ce being altered constantly, retyped,
recorrected, and eventually crushed into the format of this or that journal.
Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The
Social Construction of Scienti c Facts, 49 (1979). One
essential step toward this drafting process is the accumu-
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lation over time of the journal articles that re ect the
current state of knowledge that the journal author seeks
to advance. Latour con rms that the photocopying of
journal articles, and the use of them, is customary and
integral to the creative process of science. 82
Ultimately, Laboratory Life — one of the most in uential and controversial texts produced by science studies scholars during the previous two
decades — is reduced to the proposition that “the photocopying of
journal articles, and the use of them, is customary and integral to the
creative process of science.”
In conjunction with a particular construction of the copyright statute, Jacobs J drew on the history of science, to support the contention
that strict application would sti e progress and that professional considerations aside from pro t — “in order to gain distinction, appointment,
resources, tenure” 83 — motivate authors to read and produce the scienti c
literature.84 Referring again to Zilsel, Sir Francis Bacon, Philosophical
Transactions, William Eamon, A. Rupert Hall and Robert K. Merton’s
earlier historical study, Jacobs J insisted that the primary objective of
copyright is to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” and that
these objectives are coterminous with the scienti c project.
The incentives for scienti c publication have been in
place since the project of science began to be perceived as
a cooperative venture more than three centuries ago. 85
It is signi cant that in the realm of copyright law, even after the Supreme
Court’s seminal Daubert judgment., Jacobs J drew on the work of historians, and sociologists who had undertaken ethnographic work, rather than
the images of science developed by philosophers like Popper. As in the
case of McLean, different contexts and uses seem to encourage the production of different images of science.
We have already encountered the work of Jasanoff cited in Daubert as
a quali cation to the ef cacy of peer review. In Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., her short essay, revealingly titled “What judges should
know about the sociology of science,” was cited by a dissentient for the
proposition that the practice of science can be unruly and that social
dimensions in uence the legitimation of scienti c facts.86
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6. Conclusion: The ghost of Popper and judicial rei cation
Previously we have made allusions to some of the more overtly political dimensions of Popper’s philosophy, especially falsi cation, with limited elaboration. In part this is because these ideological dimensions of
Popper’s work are invariably opaque in the various judgments.87 Indeed, it
is quite possible that judges and even some of those championing Popper
and falsi cation may have been oblivious to this political history.88 Consequently, our conclusion will begin with a brief outline of some of these
considerations.
Popper’s academic career spanned several decades. He published from
the late 1930’s, enjoying his widest intellectual prestige in the Cold War
Anglophone world of the 1950’s and 1960’s where he exerted a long
standing in uence at the London School of Economics. Born in Austria
(1902), he was knighted in 1965. Popper’s jurisprudential rei cation in
Daubert (1993) occurred during the nadir of his career, shortly prior to
his death in 1994. By then numerous challenges to his views and alternative philosophies of science were de rigueur.
Conventionally, Popper is regarded as a politically conservative philosopher.89 The normative dimension of Popper’s philosophical work conformed to his Cold War-inspired aspirations to celebrate the superiority
of liberal democracy, the so called “Open Society,” over its fascist and
communist alternatives.90 For Popper, the conduct of scientists, displayed
by icons such as Einstein, and the critical, open-minded attitude they
supposedly embodied, through employment of the method of
falsi cationism, exempli ed the ideals underpinning liberal democracies
and the values that fascist and communist regimes actively suppressed.91
Popper openly promoted falsi cation, his demarcation criteria, as a direct
way of exposing the scienti c pretensions of Marxist social theory. Popper
argued that such theories relied on a mixture of assertions that were
unfalsi able or — even with the most charitable logical reconstructions
— had been falsi ed by historical events. Popper also challenged the
scienti c pretensions of various psychological theories, especially those
generally associated with Freudian traditions. Throughout his long career
he was quite vocal in asserting how these branches of knowledge failed to
withstand falsi cation.
Popper is regularly chosen as an authority for popular criticism of
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pseudo-science, by groups such as The Skeptics, where the more measured and frequently circumspect appraisal of his work characteristic of
specialized academic communities is often absent. Popper’s philosophy of
science is also invoked in the writings and comments of scientists, science
journalists and science educators, notwithstanding that considerable investigation by sociologists and historians has suggested only the most
tenuous relations between falsi cation and actual scienti c practice. Nevertheless popular primers, such as Brian Magee’s widely quoted text,
which contain simpli ed celebratory versions of Popper’s philosophy and
critical ideology, abound.92 It is perhaps not surprising to  nd that some
of the more recent proponents of Popper’s work, particularly those associated with legal contexts and policy debates, have been conspicuously
critical of the appearance and admission of certain types of psychological
knowledge — such as syndrome evidence — and an alleged decline in the
general standard of expert evidence admitted to US courts.93
Apart from the relative familiarity and political resonances which may
have helped Popper’s work to achieve recognition and some popularity
among certain social groups, various aspects of his philosophy may have
also predisposed it to being put to use in settings where a variety of
predominantly critical applications were possible. On the basis of its
original ideological orientation Popper’s philosophy may be particularly
susceptible to strategic iteration and appropriation. This contention is
supported if we consider an empirical investigation by Gilbert and Mulkay.
In a study of the use of images of Popper’s method in debates between
research scientists they concluded that:
The generality of the Popperian rules, their lack of interpretive particularization and their independence of
institutionalised social relationships, allow individual scientists considerable freedom to conceive of their own
actions as Popperian in character and to attribute their
intellectual success to the effectiveness of the Popperian
approach.94
In making determinations about the admissibility of scienti c evidence
judges may, similarly, refer to sources of authority for the constitution of
scienti c knowledge that are  exible and abstract.
On the basis of the materials we have presented, and there does not
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appear to be a great deal more professional history, philosophy and
sociology of science cited in federal court judgments (see Appendix),
Popper’s work appears conspicuously at a temporal juncture where the
Supreme Court was suf ciently concerned with a perception of the sociolegal circumstances to be willing to intervene: undertake judicial review
and, in effect, inaugurate an admissibility revolution.95 In Daubert, the
Court granted certiorari because of inconsistency among the federal circuits and because of widespread anxieties about spurious litigation predicated upon contentious “junk” science. 96 Originally, the majority may
have naively embraced Popper as an apparently practical means of identifying reliable expertise. If it was known, the political ideology may have
been conceived as irrelevant or inconsequential. After Daubert, however,
judicial perseverance with Popper — in the guise of a rhetorical commitment to falsi cation/testing — should be understood in more deliberate
and critical terms. The application of Daubert was wreaking effects in the
federal courts, and through Joiner and Kumho, the exclusionary aspects of
gatekeeping, declining con dence in the civil jury and recognition of the
threat posed by the existence of what the Supreme Court itself described
as “science that is junky” became more conspicuous in both the Supreme
Court jurisprudence and consequently among the federal circuits.
Recourse to citation of Popper’s philosophy of science as a legal
literary technology capable of assisting with strategic articulations of
science (and non-science) sits comfortably alongside other restrictive uses;
as in the creationism case of McLean v Arkansas.97 The apparent elegance
and simplicity of falsi cation and concurrent anxieties about unreliable
expertise were re ected in the relative success of the work by the (sometimes) polemicist Huber (and his occasional co-author Foster). In recent
decades, Huber and Foster have been cited in numerous federal court
judgments for perspectives on the nature of science or the dangers of
partisanship and junk science. Works by Foster and Huber have been
assisting judges in their gatekeeping capacities. Like Popper’s work manifested in Daubert, they have provided a range of literary resources ostensibly designed to exclude unreliable evidence, which also impact disproportionately against plaintiffs. Interestingly, notwithstanding the rhetorical
import of judicial consistency, Daubert-inspired arguments against the
reliability and admissibility of state forensic science have encountered
limited success: exempli ed in Starzecpyzel and Havvard. Often, as in the
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case of latent  nger-printing, long standing use triumphs over the strict
application of falsi cation.
In commenting upon citations, we acknowledge the potential signi cance of some of the varied conditions under which judges operate as well
as differences between courts in the legal hierarchy. While judges generally write or supervise their own judgments, there is considerable variation in the extent of in uence over the cases which come before them, the
issues which they need to decide and how they are practically resolved, the
quantity and quality of submissions, briefs and legal work, the legal and
non-legal authorities presented, the resources available to the parties and
the stakes involved both directly and indirectly as well as their own
education and experience. The appearance and use of non-legal authority
is often dif cult to anticipate and interpret. In our discussion of
(in)Signi cant Others we explained how work in the history, philosophy
and sociology of science is typically cited in support of a particular value
or norm associated with science (in-general). For example, in Mercado
Judge Zagel seems to have cited an eclectic assortment of philosophers
and anthropologists to support various arguments and perhaps more
importantly, demonstrate erudition. In contrast, in Daubert, the standing
of amici curiae such as the National Academy of Science (NAS), the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the American Medical Association (AMA) and the New England Journal of Medicine, in conjunction with the serious implications involved in the elaboration of a new federal admissibility standard, may have in uenced the
majority decision, particularly their endorsement of a fairly traditional —
but nevertheless useful — image of science extracted from the work of
Popper.98 Accepting dif culties in ascertaining how non-legal sources in uenced Zagel J, it seems reasonable, given direct reference to the amicus
curiae briefs in Daubert, that Supreme Court judges were attentive to the
submissions produced on behalf of large, well resourced and authoritative
scienti c organizations given the social context of the appeal.99
The pattern of citation of history, philosophy and sociology of science
literatures culminating in Kumho suggests that the Supreme Court does
not depend upon extrinsic support in its judgments. Popper and falsi cation were not required when judges excluded expert evidence or challenged its purported value in Brock and Mercado. It appears that citations
can be invoked in order to persuade or justify, especially in the (appar-
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ently) more radical departures such as (re-)de ning science in order to
facilitate the quali ed repudiation of Frye in Daubert. So even if not
strictly necessary, the standing of advocates (such as the NAS and AAAS)
and the pre-existing valencies or cultural capital associated with some
perspectives or approaches undoubtedly eases speci c appropriations and
the potential for criticism.100 On some issues the decision to ignore a
professional group, or develop its own framework may expose senior
courts to criticism. In such cases we can expect judges to make recourse to
legal quali cations, like those provided by Blackmun J: the resolution of
disputes by law will be distinguished from the quest for cosmic understanding. Law will be presented as an activity quite different from science.
Notwithstanding such representations, we should remain sensitive to the
possibility that on other occasions, such as in Zagel J’s Mercado judgment,
legal and scienti c epistemologies will (be made to) appear to converge.
Recourse to ostensibly reliable scienti c evidence remains essential to the
explanation and rationalization of a high percentage of legal disputes.
In the foregoing discussion, we have endeavored to provide a broad
and thematic approach to judicial references to material from the history,
philosophy and sociology of science which we acknowledge is only a
single dimension of what are almost always multi-dimensional cases and
judgments. One feature of this qualitative approach to citations is that
even if we accept its fairly narrow thematic orientation it nevertheless
provides a rich semantic platform. In concluding we hope that this article
contributes not only to an improved understanding of the uses of the
history, philosophy and sociology of science in law — subjects that have
received very little attention in their respective communities101 — but also
that it offers an example of some of the possibilities available through
qualitative citation studies. In a sense, we would contend that some of the
more quantitative approaches to citation studies provide a fairly cold and
sterile approach to social legitimacy, persuasion and the construction,
articulation and development of the law in (response to) real world
contexts.102 Without having to essentialise Popper, certain features of his
philosophy were embraced and perpetuated. Accepting a place for quantitative studies, we would contend that our analysis of the appearance and
uses of Popper (and science studies more generally) are more informative
than quantitative attempts to record the number of times Popper or social
scientists appear in judgments, the types of litigation or characteristics of
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the court or judge. All of these may be useful, as a form of background
information, but the reasons Popper, as opposed to another philosopher
or aspect of his philosophy appears, and why he appears and disappears at
particular times and places tend to remain beyond the scope of such
analyses. In contrast, our approach offers more explanatory purchase. Our
interpretation explores uses and purposes. From this perspective, the fact
that Popper (and the others) do not appear in Kumho is just as signi cant
— or deserving of attention and explanation — as his debut in the sociopolitical matrix surrounding the production of Daubert. It is our contention that omitting explicit reference to Popper from the Kumho judgment
re ects judicial exnomination as an aspect of his philosophy was transformed into law.103
In this way our approach to Popper, which attempts to map the
in uence of citation in contextual qualitative terms, bears similarity with
the approach adopted by Latour and Woolgar in their seminal text Laboratory Life. Mapping the processes of citation in stabilizing scienti c facts,
Latour and Woolgar explained the importance of locating citations against
the context of their use and the form of statement linked to them.104 For
Latour and Woolgar citation is an important part of the fact-making
process they describe as “literary inscription” — a cycle of activity where
the work of scientists is transformed as it travels through various contexts
and processes of literary production ranging from measuring devices,
laboratory reports to the scienti c paper. As a “fact” reaches the status of
temporary closure the signs of negotiation, uncertainty and other “modalities” are effaced. This can be understood as largely consistent with the
rei cation of Popper, consequent upon his disappearance as literal textual
entity, as testing. Latour and Woolgar note that the strength and facticity
of statements about scienti c entities frequently are proportional to the
absence of qualifying citations and conditional statements. Working backwards from accepted statements in authoritative scienti c texts towards
earlier laboratory and informal contexts more citations and contextual
modalities appear attached to statements:105
The function of literary inscription is the successful persuasion of readers, but the readers are only fully convinced when all the sources of persuasion seem to have
disappeared. In other words, the various operations of
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writing and reading which sustain an argument are seen
by participants to be largely irrelevant to “facts,” which
emerge solely by virtue of these same operations.106
The apparent absence of Popper, or his virtual or ghostly presence, does
not mean the end of the in uence or the ethos ushered in, in part, by
drawing upon his social capital, or authority.107 Rather, new images of
legal “science” — less legally (and socially) controversial — have become
routinized: available to serve as legitimatory resources. 108
Our analysis was made possible by contextualizing Popper’s philosophy and locating its invocation and use at a particular temporal juncture.
Notably, where federal circuits were interpreting the FRE inconsistently,
partially in response to mass tort litigation, an increased volume of litigation and concerns about the availability of insurance. 109 The appearance of
new investigative techniques, such as DNA pro ling in the early 1990s,
presumably also in uenced the Court to hear the Daubert appeal.110 By
1998, when the Supreme Court heard the appeal in Kumho there was
suf cient social warrant and judicial authority, re ected in federal court
jurisprudence, a social problem literature, submissions and legal academic
commentary, to efface reference to the secondary (non-legal) sources
originally relied upon to support the Daubert majority’s framing of science. The transformation of Popperian “falsi ability” into a legally acceptable image of not only scienti c — but also technical and specialized —
knowledge was complete. Together, the provision of tools (the various
criteria articulated in Daubert and their subsequent elaborations) and a
restrictive ethos were later reinforced in General Electric Co. v. Joiner
(1997) and emphatically exempli ed in Kumho Tyre Co. v. Carmichael
(1999). 111 We should note that while federal circuits had been inconsistent throughout the twentieth century in their admissibility practices, it
was only when inconsistency was seen as a suf ciently serious socio-legal
problem that the Supreme Court intervened, and through Joiner and
Kumho continued to intervene.
Quantitative studies not only tell us very little about why Popper  rst
appears, but in addition, they do not adequately explain why the Supreme
Court granted certorari in Daubert and Kumho, or the social signi cance
of the case which led highly respected and in uential organisations such
as the National Academy of Sciences and the American Association for
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the Advancement of Sciences, and many others, to submit amicus curiae
briefs. Citation studies also tend to remain mute about the implications
of selecting particular sources/theories; about dissent such as that voiced
by Rehnquist CJ; and about the existence of cultural and ideological
baggage associated with authorities — like Popper and other academics
such as Merton, Latour and Jasanoff. Interestingly, courts tended to
endorse and perpetuate restrictive dimensions of Popper’s approach to
demarcating science from other forms of inferior types of knowledge, but
made few attempts to engage or even consider the epistemological relativism and political implications of work by Latour or Jasanoff.112
We can only speculate about what quantitative citation studies would
make of all this.
For the purpose of our discussion we included Section 5, (in)Signi cant
Others, predominantly to provide the reader with some indication of the
circumstances in which the work of other prominent theorists of science
has been cited. These examples reinforce one of our major claims: that
context shapes use.113 The work of Merton, Latour and Jasanoff is cited to
support particular arguments. Their work stands (as authority) for particular propositions, norms or acts. Others could have been cited, and
alternative approaches were possible. Signi cantly, several appear in dissentient judgments. In contrast to Popper in Daubert, these authors are
not used to support a macroscopic model of science,114 but more limited
insights into particular features of scienti c practice and commitments:
such as the proper level of openness and secrecy or the fantastically
mundane observation about how scientists routinely make and use photocopies. From our perspective, as sociologists of science, these uses might
be characterised as thin descriptions.115 They exemplify extremely “thin”
descriptions of the various bodies of work, or even the particular volumes
cited. We accept that this is not the only possible reading, even amongst
sociologists of science. But, just for the record, we would challenge a
reader from any discipline or tradition to examine Laboratory Life for
themselves.
Typically, reference to work from the history, philosophy and social
studies of science comprises only a small part of any judgment. The
presence of this work, however, implies that it ful lls some role(s), and it
is to these roles that we have endeavoured to attend.116 Litigation and
judgments are special contexts and genres where authors, literatures and
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ideas are removed from some of their more usual groundings. Without
intending to attribute an essential meaning to the science studies corpus,
the genre of judgment writing enables judges to incorporate a range of
opinions, sources and authorities and to deal with them quite capriciously. The aegis of doing law effectively insulates judicial practice from
other types of activity, especially re exive epistemology. We saw how
Blackmun J explained that he was not doing cosmology, and Rehnquist
CJ didn’t expect judges to become amateur scientists, or even philosophers for that matter. Recourse to law and things legal — such as procedure and rules, legal standards and tests, burdens of proof, expedition and
even justice — enabled judges to remain relatively immune from exogenous comment and criticism. We accept that judges aren’t doing social
theory, they’re doing judging.117 But we should never forget that judging is
both ideological and practical.
Notwithstanding some inconsistency in application, it is our contention that as a generalization Daubert and its progency have contributed to
a more restrictive era in admissibility jurisprudence. Daubert may not
only have made it more dif cult for plaintiffs and criminal defendants to
have their expert evidence admitted, but it may have simultaneously
chilled litigation, making it harder to pursue certain types of legal action.
What to some may have appeared as the innocuous appearance of
Popper may have signaled the inauguration of a subtle but dramatic shift
in the US litigation landscape. For how long the judicial necromancy will
continue, and with what resources Popper’s ghost will be exorcised, remain to be seen.

Appendix
We searched for over 100 historians, philosophers and sociologists
based on our own familiarity with the  eld, bibliographies in leading
journals and texts, and by following citations in federal courts. For example, we were particularly sensitive to authors (like Popper) cited in the
leading judgments (such as Daubert). Accepting that we may have “missed”
eminent scholars, we would contend that we have not overlooked (m)any
from the most in uential federal admissibility decisions of the last few
decades. In undertaking this survey it was our intention to be indicative
rather than exhaustive. Judgments cited in the article are denoted with an
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asterix (*). Typically, the inquiry — conducted on Westlaw — was limited
by searching for a name (such as “Kuhn”) and a root (such as “scien!”)
appearing in the same paragraph. The results were as follows:
Jonathan Cole and Stephen Cole
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 40
L.Ed.2d 315, 181 U.S.P.Q. 673 (U.S.Ohio 1974).*
Bernard Barber
Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 190 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 4 Media L.
Rep. 1122 (D.C.Cir. 1978).*
Rudolf Carnap
Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F.2d 413
(2nd Cir. 1947).
Berg v. Morris, 483 F.Supp. 179 (E.D.Cal.1980).
Morris Cohen
Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F.2d 413
(2nd Cir. 1947).
American Kennel Club v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920, 45-1 USTC P 9268, 33
A.F.T.R. 1209 (2nd Cir. 1945).
William Eamon
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 63 USLW 2295,
1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,312, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (2nd Cir. 1994).*
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 144 A.L.R. Fed.
745, 1995 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,417, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513 (2nd Cir.
1994).*
Stephen Jay Gould
Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 107 S.Ct. 2022, 95
L.Ed.2d 582, 55 USLW 4626, 43 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 1305,
43 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,018, 38 Ed. Law Rep. 1165 (U.S.Pa.
1987).
Perkins v. Lake County Dept. of Utilities, 860 F.Supp. 1262 (N.D. Ohio
1994).
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A. Rupert Hall
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 63 USLW 2295,
1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,312, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (2nd Cir. 1994).*
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 144 A.L.R. Fed.
745, 1995 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,417, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513 (2nd Cir.
1994).*
Carl Hempel
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 61 USLW 4805, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, 23
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,979, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, Prod.Liab.Rep.
(CCH) P 13,494 (1993).*
National Ass’n of Farmworkers Organizations v. Marshall, 628 F.2d 604, 24
Wage & Hour Cas. (BNA) 564, 202 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 88 Lab.Cas.
P 33,892, 1980 O.S.H.D. (CCH) P 24,309 (D.C.Cir. 1980).
U.S. v. Havvard, 117 F.Supp.2d 848, 55 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1087 (S.D.Ind.
2000).*
Savage v. Union Paci c R. Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 1021 (E.D.Ark. 1999).*
National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d
942 (E.D.Ark. 1998).*
National Bank of Commerce (of El Dorado, Ark.) v. Dow Chemical Co., 965
F.Supp. 1490 (E.D.Ark., 1996).*
Freeman v. Case Corp., 924 F.Supp. 1456, 44 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1041,
Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 14,768 (W.D.Va. 1996).*
City of Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 877 F.Supp. 1504, 1995-1
Trade Cases P 70,967 (N.D.Ala. 1995).*
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 827 F.Supp.
1014, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).*
Granville House, Inc. v. Department of Health and Human Services, 550
F.Supp. 628 (D.Minn. 1982).
Sheila Jasanoff
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 61 USLW 4805, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, 23
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,979, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, Prod.Liab.Rep.
(CCH) P 13,494 (1993).*
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 63 USLW 2663, 34
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U.S.P.Q.2d 1321 Fed.Cir.(Pa.) (1995).*
Savage v. Union Paci c R. Co., 67 F.Supp.2d 1021 (E.D.Ark.,1999).*
National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d
942 (E.D.Ark.,1998).*
National Bank of Commerce (of El Dorado, Ark.) v. Dow Chemical Co., 965
F.Supp. 1490 (E.D.Ark., 1996).*
Daniel Kevles
Government of Virgin Islands v. Penn., 838 F.Supp. 1054 (D.Virgin Islands, 1993).
Thomas Kuhn
Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 874 F.2d 307, 57 USLW
2742, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 12,157 (5th Cir. 1989).*
U.S. v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 52 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 257 (D.Mass.,
1999).*
U.S. ex rel. Kokoraleis v. Director of Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 963
F.Supp. 1473 (N.D.Ill., 1997).*
In re Breast Implant Cases, 942 F.Supp. 958, 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 68
(E.D.N.Y., 1996).
Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F.Supp. 1097, 59 USLW 2519, 32 Fed. R. Evid.
Serv. 397 (N.D.Ill., 1991).*
Bruno Latour
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 63 USLW 2295,
1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,312, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (2nd Cir. 1994).*
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 144 A.L.R. Fed.
745, 1995 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,417, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513 (2nd Cir.
1994).*
Larry Laudan
Estate of Mauro By and Through Mauro v. Borgess Medical Center, 137 F.3d
398, 7 A.D. Cases 1571, 12 NDLR P 23 (6th Cir. 1998).
David Lindberg
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 63 USLW 2295,
1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,312, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (2nd Cir. 1994).*
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American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 144 A.L.R. Fed.
745, 1995 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,417, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513 (2nd Cir.
1994).*
Robert Merton
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 94 S.Ct. 1879, 40 L.Ed.2d
315, 181 U.S.P.Q. 673 (1974).*
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 37 F.3d 881, 63 USLW 2295,
1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,312, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (2nd Cir. 1994).*
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 144 A.L.R. Fed.
745, 1995 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,417, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1513 (2nd Cir.
1994).*
Forsham v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 190 U.S.App.D.C. 231, 4 Media L.
Rep. 1122 (D.C.Cir. 1978).*
Blaz v. Michael Reese Hosp. Foundation, 74 F.Supp.2d 803 (N.D.Ill. 1999).*
Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software Intern., 740 F.Supp. 37, 59
USLW 2071, 1990 Copr.L.Dec. P 26,595, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d 1577
(D.Mass. 1990).*
Ernst Nagel
Old Colony Bondholders v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co., 161 F.2d 413
(2nd Cir. 1947).
In re Joint Eastern and Southern Dist. Asbestos Litigation, 827 F.Supp.
1014, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,566 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).*
American Kennel Club v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920, 45-1 USTC P 9268, 33
A.F.T.R. 1209 (2nd Cir. 1945).
Dorothy Nelkin
McLean v. Arkansas Bd. of Ed., 529 F.Supp. 1255, 2 Ed. Law Rep. 685
(E.D.Ark., 1982).*
Otto Neurath
American Kennel Club v. Hoey, 148 F.2d 920, 45-1 USTC P 9268, 33
A.F.T.R. 1209 (2nd Cir. 1945).
Michael Polanyi
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 92 S.Ct. 2576 (1972).
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Karl Popper
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct.
2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469, 61 USLW 4805, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1200, 23
Envtl. L. Rep. 20,979, 37 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 1, Prod.Liab.Rep.
(CCH) P 13,494 (1993).*
Moore v. Ashland Chemical, Inc., 126 F.3d 679, 47 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 881
(5th Cir. 1997).*
U.S. v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 62 USLW 2450, 38 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 688
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For a sample of Popper’s best known discussion of his philosophy of science, see Conjectures and Refutations (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963) and The Logic of Scienti c
Discovery (London: Hutchison, 1959). For some standard philosophical critiques of
Popper’s philosophy, see Alan Chalmers, What is this Thing Called Science (St.Lucia:
University of Queensland Press, 1976), pp. 35–46; David Oldroyd, The Arch of Knowledge (Kensington: New South Wales University Press, 1986), pp. 297–317. It is important to indicate that it is not our intention in the following discussion to offer a
philosophical critique of Popper’s philosophy per se.

2

Frye v US, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir. 1923); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
509 U.S. 579, 125 L. Ed.2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).

3

For a critical examination of this litigation and its legal analysis, see Gary Edmond and
David Mercer, “Litigation Life: Law-Science Knowledge Construction in (Bendectin)
Mass Toxic Tort Litigation,” 30 Social Studies of Science 265 (2000).
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593, 125 L. Ed.2d 469,
483, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993). (emphasis added)
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One of the early authoritative legal sources for discussions of authority is John Henry
Merryman, “The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in
1950,” 6 Stan. L. Rev. 613 (1954).
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Michael Green, “Expert Witnesses and the suf ciency of Evidence in Toxic Substances
Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Litigation,” 86 Northwestern U.
L. Rev. 643 (1992). See also Michael Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of
Mass Toxic Substances Litigation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996).
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Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993). Compare
Claar v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 29 F.3d 499, 501 (9th Cir. 1994); Hopkins v. Dow
Corning Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Paoli R.R. Yard P.C.B.
Litigation, 35 F.3d 717, 743–745, 746 (3rd Cir. 1994); Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
947 F. Supp. 1387, 1399, 1411 (D. Or. 1996).
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522 U.S. 136, 139 L Ed 2d 508, 519, 118 S. Ct. 512 (1997). See also Gary Edmond,
“Deating Daubert: Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael and the inevitability of general acceptance (Frye),” 23 U. New South Wales L. J. 38 (2000).

9

509 U.S. 579, 594. 125 L. Ed.2d 469, 483, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2797 (1993). (emphasis
added)

10

Such as the cases of Smith, Williams, Downing and Jack Weinstein and Margaret Berger’s
textbook, Federal Evidence.

11

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 125 L. Ed.2d 469, 486 (1993). In
December 2000, Rule 702 was amended. See Catherine Brixen and Christine Meis,
“Codifying the ‘Daubert Trilogy’: The Amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 702,” 40
Jurimetrics J. 527 (2000).

12

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 487 (1993).

13

Steven Goldberg, Culture Clash: Law and Science in America (New York: New York
University Press, 1994); Gary Edmond and David Mercer, “Manifest Destiny: Law and
Science in America,” 10 Metascience 40 (1996). A similar tendency is apparent in some
autopoetic approaches. Compare, e.g., Richard Nobles and David Schiff, Understanding
Miscarriages of Justice: Law, the Media, and the Inevitability of Crisis (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000), and Gary Edmond, “Whigs in Court: Historiographical Problems with Expert Evidence,” 14 Yale J. L. & Humanities 123–75 (2002).

14

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 485 (1993), p. 485.
(emphasis added)

15

Elsewhere we have examined how judicial expressions of causation are frequently couched
with similar sorts of quali cations in order to distinguish legal causation from articulations by philosophers and scientists. See Gary Edmond and David Mercer, “Rebels
without a cause: Judges, scienti c evidence and the uses of causation,” in Ian Freckelton
and Danuta Mendelson, eds., Causation in Law and Medicine (Dartmouth: Ashgate,
2002), pp. 83–121.

16

John Schuster and Richard Yeo, eds., The Politics and Rhetoric of Scienti c Method
(Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Reidel 1986); David Mercer, “Scienti c Method Dis-
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courses in the Construction of ‘EMF Science’: Interests, Resources and Rhetoric in
Submissions to a Public Inquiry,” 32 Social Studies of Science 205–33 (2002).
17

For an analysis of the implications of classi cation, consider: Geoffrey Bowker and Susan
Starr, Sorting Things Out: Classi cation and its Consequences (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1999).

18

For a succinct background discussion of Popper and Hempel set against broader traditions in the philosophy of science, see John Losee, A Historical Introduction to the
Philosophy of Science, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, fourth edition, 2001),
pp. 143–176.

19

Popper’s popularity may be, in part, attributable to his willingness to explicitly link his
ideals of scienti c method to normative and quite prescriptive accounts of the nature of
science. Some of the normative orientation, associated with his early career, can be linked
to his Cold War political views, and in his later career to fears that the images of science
promoted by Kuhn and others represented a dangerous skepticism towards the scienti c
enterprise. See discussions in: Oldroyd, supra note 1; John Horgan, The End of Science:
Facing the Limits of Knowledge in the Twilight of the Scienti c Age (London: Abacus,
1998), pp. 32–41; Brian Magee, Popper (London: Woburn Press, 1974); Randal Albury,
The Politics of Objectivity (Melbourne: Deakin University Press, 1983), pp. 18–33;
“Symposium: Karl Popper, 1902–1994, Learning from Negative Instances,” 70 Radical
Philosophy 2 (1995); Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave, Criticism and the Growth of
Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974).

20

This sits oddly with some of the discussion of liberality associated with Frye and the FRE.
We acknowledge that the majority Daubert judgment explicitly claims that it is acting in
ful llment of the liberalization of admissibility laws required by the enactment of the
FRE in 1975. Indeed, after the Daubert judgment was handed down both parties
publicly claimed victory. While the Court might have been disingenuous in its account
there are alternative explanations considered by or consistent with the thrust of this
article. Brie y, in some courts Frye had been used to actively exclude evidence so that
alternative tests may have been conceived as more liberal. Another possibility is that the
judges — acting as naïve realists — were interested in the model of science, championed
by authoritative amici such as the NAS and AAAS, as relevant and useful criteria for
identifying genuine and implicitly reliable knowledge.
We should also indicate that we do not intend to make a teleological claim about
the Supreme Court’s designs. These may have developed diachronically as the exclusionary ethos seems to have been intensi ed in the later cases of Joiner and Kumho.

21

It would seem that by characterizing the Daubert decision as some type of judicial
accommodation, by which we mean a type of pragmatic eclecticism, the question of why
particular authors and images of science were preferred remains obscured. We suggest
that appropriation is a better description because accommodation implies an inclusive
dimension to divergent philosophical positions which are neither accommodated in the
Supreme Court judgments nor in subsequent judicial practice. The Daubert and Kumho
appeals were heard because of social and legal concerns about expert opinion evidence in
the federal courts. Even if the judges were originally ambivalent or to some degree
accommodating of various theoretical positions, a more plausible reading of the Supreme
Court appeals from Daubert to Kumho is that they constitute an escalating judicial
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response to perceived socio-legal problems with few indications of any incorporation of
constructivist or critical approaches to the sciences. For some discussion of these issues,
consider: Sheila Jasanoff, “Beyond Epistemology: Relativism and Engagement in the
Politics of Science,” 26 Social Studies of Science 393, 403 (1996); Sheila Jasanoff, Science
at the Bar: Law, Science and Technolog y in America (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 63. See also David Caudill and Richard Redding, “Junk Philosophy of
Science?: The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts,” 57 Wash.
& Lee L. Rev. 685 (2000); Gary Edmond and David Mercer, “Representing the sociology of scienti c knowledge and law,” 19 Science Communication 307 (1998). Our own
work has been cited in several Australian federal court judgments and in oral argument
before the Australian High Court. However, we would be reluctant to suggest that these
citations provide much evidence for its impact on Australian jurisprudence.
22

Notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, research into scienti c practice and scienti c
controversies has been used to demonstrate some of the potential dif culties associated
with attempts to determine what should count as a valid test. We would contend that
much non-mainstream and novel “science” placed before courts could still claim to be, in
some way, testable or have arisen from some form of testing. Where there is fundamental
theoretical disagreement one party in a scienti c dispute may argue that some claims are
not testable because experiments are measuring phantom effects that are theoretically
implausible or that a given test is  awed. Informal and relatively  exible considerations of
whether a test and a result are theoretically plausible appear to be more important than
the mechanical application of abstract philosophical models of scienti c method. According to Michael Mulkay and Nigel Gilbert, “Putting Philosophy to Work: Karl
Popper’s In uence on Scienti c Practice,” 11 Philosophy of the Social Sciences 389, 398
(1981):
[A]ssessments of conformity to Popper’s basic rule of scienti c method
hinge on scientists’ interpretation of the term “falsi cation”; and the
meaning of “falsi cation” depends entirely on researchers’ technical and
scienti c judgments. In situations of scienti c uncertainty these judgments, and hence the meaning of the Popperian rules, will be variable.
Consequently, when there is uncertainty, the Popperian rules cannot
provide a straightforward guide for scientists’ actions or decisions. There
is a gap between the rule and particular action which can only be bridged
by the very scienti c choice which the rule is intended to constrain.
For more detailed discussions of some of these issues see Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch,
Frames of Meaning: The Social Construction of Extraordinary Science (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul Ltd, 1982); Harry Collins and Trevor Pinch, The Golem: What Everyone
Should Know About Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1993); Harry Collins
and Trevor Pinch, The Golem at Large (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996);
David Gooding, Trevor Pinch and Simon Schaffer, eds., The Uses of Experiment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Gary Edmond and David Mercer, “Keeping
Junk History, Philosophy and Sociology of Science out of the Courtroom: Problems with
the Reception of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.” 20 U. New South Wales
L. J. 48 (1997).

23

See, e.g., Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 368 (7th Cir. 1996).
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24

Jasanoff is cited, in Daubert, for limitations to peer review and publication. These
citations and references tend to displace her constructivist theoretical position, and apart
from quali ed reference by a dissentient in the case of Westman (discussed below) she is
never cited for, or associated with, constructivist insights or a relativist epistemology.
Super cially, Jasanoff ’s analysis of peer review bears resemblance to other works, such as
Daryl Chubin and Edward Hackett, Peerless Science: Peer Review and US Science Policy
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990) and Marcel LaFollete, Stealing Into
Print: Fraud, Misconduct and Plagiarism in Scienti c Publishing (London: University of
California Press, 1992), and those of Relman, Angell and Horrobin, which do not share
all of Jasanoff ’s theoretical predispositions. See also Jasanoff, supra note 21. For a recent
review of academic peer review, see Juan Miguel Campanario, “Peer Review for Journals
as it Stands Today-Part Two” 19 Science Communciation 277 (1998) and the empirical
work of Harry Collins, “Tantalus and the aliens: Publications, audiences and the search
for gravitational waves,” 29 Social Studies of Science 163 (1999).

25

At the very least, a respectable, or perhaps safe, model for legal purposes.

26

877 F.Supp. 1504, 1529 (N.D.Ala. 1995).

27

For a discussion of the contestation and negotiation around the construction of scienti c
boundaries, consider: Thomas Gieryn, Cultural boundaries of science: Credibility on the
line (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), and Bowker and Starr, supra note 17.

28

Note the tautological loop. The selection of falsi cation as the scienti c method and the
appropriate means of identifying scienti c knowledge, in effect determines what is
scienti c and therefore to be considered reliable.

29

US v Havvard, 117 F.Supp.2d 848, 852 (S.D.Ind. 2000). See also Simon Cole, Suspect
identities: A history of  ngerprinting and criminal identi cation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 2001); Jennifer Mnookin, “The Image of Truth: Photographic Evidence
and the Power of Analogy” 10 Yale J. L. & Humanities 1 (1998).

30

In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp. 1014, 1026–
1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); National Bank of Commerce v. Dow Chemical Co., 965 F.Supp.
1490, 1494 (E.D.Ark. 1996); National Bank of Commerce v. Associated Milk Producers, Inc., 22 F.Supp.2d 942, 947–948 (E.D.Ark. 1998); Savage v. Union Paci c Railroad
Company, 67 F.Supp.2d 1021 (E.D.Ark. 1999). The last three judgments were all
written by Judge Eisele.

31

43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995).

32

Peter Huber, Galileo’s Revenge: Junk science in the courtroom (New York: Basic Books,
1991). Compare: Kenneth Chesebro, “Galileo’s retort: Peter Huber’s junk scholarship,”
42 American U. L. Rev. 1637 (1993); Edmond and Mercer supra note 13; Gary Edmond
and David Mercer, “Trashing ‘junk’ science,” Stan. Tech. L. Rev. <http://stlr.stanford.edu/
STLR/Articles/98_STLR_3/contents_f.htm> (1998).

33

Huber, supra note 32 at 192–228. Although a more detailed reading of Popper reveals
that despite his best known claims for falsi cation as a clean philosophical/logical criteria
for demarcating science from non-science he also stipulated the need for scientists to
nurture the appropriate critical attitude. See Oldroyd, supra note 1, and Horgan, Albury,
Magee, supra note 19.

34

43 F.3d 1311, 1317. It is worth observing that Blackmun J’s cosmological caveat might
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actually be invoked, in response to the Court of Appeals’ approach to Daubert on
remand, to argue that courts will not always require pure or idealized models of expert
opinion. In endeavoring to resolve refractory problems expeditiously, courts may divert
from the quest for cosmological understanding that purportedly underpins the modern
sciences.
35

Ronald Allen, “Expertise and the Daubert Decision,” 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1157
(1994).

36

US v. Director of Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 963 F.Supp. 1473 (N.D.Ill. 1997).

37

963 F.Supp. 1473, 1489–1490 (N.D.Ill. 1997).

38

Kenneth Foster and Peter Huber, Judging science: Scienti c knowledge and the federal courts
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998). Compare Gary Edmond and David Mercer, “Juggling
science: From polemic to pastiche,” 13 Social Epistemology 215 (1999).

39

Ironically, because the Supreme Court endorsed an eclectic and highly idealized model of
scienti c method, that was not based on actual study of what scientists do in their dayto-day work, expert witnesses have become increasingly dependent upon lawyers to
translate and frame their practices and evidence into legally tractable forms. By invoking
Popper, courts have to some extent exacerbated the very conditions they were endeavoring to ameliorate. This is one of the costs of both Blackmun J’s inoculation and
Rehnquist CJ’s prophylactic approach. In addition, the new standards provide means to
challenge almost any submission, on the basis of inadequacies of testing and replication.
See Harry Collins, Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scienti c Practice (
London: University of Chicago Press,1985), and Collins and Pinch, supra note 22; Mike
Lynch, “The Discursive Production of Uncertainty: The OJ Simpson ‘Dream Team’ and
the Sociology of Knowledge Machine,” 28 Social Studies of Science 829 (1998).

40

55 F.Supp.2d 62, 65 (D.Mass. 1999).

41

Alexander Morgan Capron, “Daubert and the Quest for Value-Free “Scienti c Knowledge” in the Courtroom,” 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 85 (1996); Margaret Farrell, “Coping with
Scienti c Evidence: The Use of Special Masters,” 43 Emory L. J. 927 (1994) and
“Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Epistemiology and Legal Process,” 15
Cardozo L. Rev. 2183 (1994); Peter Schuck, “Multicultural Redux: Science, Law and
Politics,” 11 Yale L. Policy Rev. 1 (1993).

42

US v. Hines, 55 F.Supp.2d 62, 65 (D.Mass. 1999).

43

There has been an ongoing assault on evidence generated through the examination of
handwriting. This accords well with our general discussion of anxieties about forms of
unreliable science. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger, Mark Denbeaux and Michael J. Saks,
“Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting
Identi cation Expertise,” 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 731 (1989).

44

880 F.Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y 1995).

45

880 F.Supp. 1027, 1040. (italics added) See also Freeman v. Case Corp., 924 F.Supp.
1456, 1466 (W.D.Va. 1996).

46

126 F.3d 679, 685 (5th Cir. 1997). Citing Green, Popper and Faigman, Judge Dennis
distinguished between “hard” or “Newtonian” science and “knowledge outside the realm
of hard science.” The term Newtonian stems from the work of the eminent evidence
scholar Imwinkelried and appears to be based on a very casual analysis of the history and
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philosophy of science, Green, supra note 6; Edward Imwinkelried, “The Next Step After
Daubert, Developing a Similarly Epistemological Approach to Ensuring the Reliability of
Nonscienti c Expert Testimony,” 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 2271 (1994); David Faigman, “To
have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and
Policy,” 38 Emory L. J. 1005 (1989). Judge Dennis also cited the case of Starzecpyzel.
47

143 L. Ed.2d 238 (1999).

48

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 143 L. Ed.2d 238, 252 (1999).

49

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 139 L. Ed.2d 508, 519, 118 S. Ct. 512
(1997).

50

This is an escalation from “role” (Rehnquist CJ) and “responsibility” (Blackmun J)
espoused in Daubert.

51

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 143 L. Ed.2d 238, 253, 257 (1999). Justice Stevens was
critical of this practice. Nevertheless, the majority’s exempli cation and the ideological
value of casting Carlson as a junk scientist was signi cant: “We further explain the way in
which a trial judge ‘may’ consider Daubert’s factors by applying these considerations to
the case at hand.” See Gary Edmond, “Legal Engineering: Contested representations of
law, science (and non-science) and society,” 32 Social Studies of Science (2002) (forthcoming).

52

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 143 L Ed 2d 238, 253 (1999). It is not our intention to
enter this non-re exive debate about the adequacy of Carlson’s opinion, other than to
suggest that the Supreme Court’s orientation is not the only way to interpret the case,
and to indicate how different models of science and particular emphases enable judges,
and others, to represent and treat expert evidence in quite inconsistent ways. See, e.g.,
Gary Edmond, “Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the ‘Facts’ to Speak for themselves”
23 S. Ill. U. L. J. 555 (1999).

53

Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 143 L. Ed.2d 238, 251 (1999).

54

Even if the inclusion of quali cations was a form of judicial accommodation, subsequently they could be elided and displaced. Of course, Supreme Court judges do not
have complete control over the use of their decisions.

55

Several articles and books have examined the case of McLean v Arkansas, see Michael
Ruse, ed., But is it Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy (New York: Prometheus Books, 1996); “Special Section on Creationism, Science,
and the Law,” 40 Science Technolog y and Human Values 9 (1982); Thomas Gieryn, G.
Bevins and S. Zehr, “Professionalization of American Scientists: Public Science in the
Creation/Evolution Trials,” 50 American Sociological Review 392 (1985); Marcel LaFollette,
Creationism, Science and the Law: The Arkansas Case (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1983).

56

529 F.Supp 1255 (E.D.Ark. 1982).

57

529 F.Sup 1255, 1267.

58

529 F.Supp. 1255, 1268.

59

This position is supported by the images of science presented in amicus curiae briefs
submitted in a later appeal — involving another creation science case — to the Supreme
Court in Aguillard v Edwards, 482 U.S. 578, 107 S. Ct. 2573 (1987). In that case, the
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images of science propounded again re ected the exigencies of the case (context of use),
and also the federal jurisprudence. In a brief submitted on behalf of 72 Nobel laureates
(and others) general acceptance — the dominant legal standard prior to Daubert — is
invoked in addition to the testing of naturalistic explanations. For example: “Neither
appellants nor their af ants suggest that their de nition of “creation science” is generally
accepted” and “Science is devoted to formulating and testing naturalistic explanations for
natural phenomena. . . . The scienti c method involves the rigorous, methodological
testing of principles that might present a naturalistic explanation for those facts. . . . An
explanatory principle that is by its nature cannot be tested is outside the realm of
science.” It is interesting to note the emphasis placed in a secondary account of the
construction of the amicus brief produced by the Nobel laureates in the work of Michael
Shermer, director of the The Skeptics (US). In his account the brief is portrayed as if it
represented a unique point in the construction of a uni ed image of the scienti c
method. Shermer does not acknowledge that other briefs may have produced or endorsed
different de nitions and emphases, see Michael Shermer, Why People Believe Weird Things:
Pseudoscience , Superstition, and other confusions of our time (New York: Freeman, 1997),
pp. 154–172.
Another brief in Edwards also placed different emphases. In the brief submitted by
the NAS, they suggest that scienti c  ndings “have con rmed the essential validity of the
theory of evolution developed by Charles Darwin and others.” They also stress that:
“Creation-science is not science. It cannot meet any of the criteria of science. Indeed it
fails to display the most basic characteristic of science: reliance upon naturalistic explanations. . . . Science welcomes new discoveries and ideas. Scientists operate within a system
designed for continuous testing of ideas.”
60

Overton’s J judgment, following the testimony of philosopher of science Michael Ruse,
tends to treat testability and falsi cation as overlapping categories, see Michael Ruse,
“Witness Testimony Sheet, McLean v. Arkansas,” in Ruse, supra note 55 at 302. Our own
research has identi ed some unusual twists in the use of Popperian philosophy in an
Australian trial which concerned claims made about the existence of Noah’s Ark. See
Gary Edmond and David Mercer, “Saving science: Creating (public) science in the
Noah’s Ark case,” 8 Public Understanding of Science 317 (1999). Others have noted the
willingness, depending on the speci c context, for proponents of creation science to
bolster their claims by enrolling images of scienti c practice from the philosophy of
science. See, e.g., Dorothy Nelkin, Science Textbook Controversies and the Politics of Equal
Time (Cambridge, Mass,: MIT Press, 1977); Simon Locke, “The Use of Scienti c
Discourse by Creation Scientists: Some Preliminary Findings,” 3 Public Understanding of
Science 403 (1994). At various times during his career Popper questioned the falsi ability
of the central plank of Darwinian evolution by natural selection, namely “the survival of
the  ttest.” See K. Popper, Unended Quest (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court,1976) pp. 167–79,
234–35. The possibility of using Popper’s philosophy as a tool to challenge the scienti c
veracity of Darwinism raises some interesting ironies. Consider the discussion in Michael
Ruse, “Prologue: A Philosopher’s Day in Court” in Ruse, supra note 55 at13–35; Larry
Laudan, “Science at the Bar: Causes for Concern” 7 Science Technology & Human Values
61 (1982); Philip Quinn, “The Philosopher of Science as Expert Witness,” in James
Cushing, C.F. Delaney and Gary Gutting, eds., Science and Reality: Recent Work in the
Philosophy of Science (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984) pp. 32–
53.
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61

We would not contend that these isolated uses are as systematic as the Daubert-inspired
references after 1993.

62

756 F.Supp. 1097 (N.D.Ill. 1991).

63

756 F.Supp. at 1099, 1101. Such an onerous standard seems to conform to Zagel J’s
anxiety that courts are too liberal in their admissibility decisions: “Neither courts nor
scientists agree what precise degree is required for entry into the canon of science or
admissibility. I would be satis ed if we excluded what we sometimes admit, that is,
expertise with virtually no reliability and no validity.”

64

Notably, here Zagel J makes no attempt to distinguish fact- nding in law from scienti c
inquiry. This is inconsistent with the dichotomy developed in relation to Blackmun’s J
Daubert opinion. Note that after Daubert Zagel J endorsed a Popperian approach in US
v. Director of Illinois Dept. of Corrections.

65

874 F.2d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 1989), citing Bert Black, “A Uni ed Theory of Scienti c
Evidence,” 56 Fordham L. Rev. 595 (1988) and Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scienti c
Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 5–7.

66

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 125 L. Ed.2d 469, 485.

67

For discussion of Merton and the traditional “standard” sociological view of science, see
Michael Mulkay, Science and the Sociology of Knowledge (London: George Allen and
Unwin, 1979), pp. 19–26.

68

Well known studies by Merton include his Weberian inspired thesis, Science Technology
and Society in Seventeenth Century England (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), [originally published in Osiris (1938)], where he linked the rise of modern science to the
cultural ethos of Puritanism. Merton also made major contributions to methodology in
the sociology of science, The Sociology of Science: Theoretical and Empirical Investigations
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1973); T. Gieryn, ed., Science and Social Structure
(A Festschrift for RK Merton) (New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1980). Interestingly, Merton and his students were in uential in the development of scientometrics and
bibliographical studies of scienti c texts. Debates about the respective value of qualitative
versus quantitative approaches continue in the sociology of science. For a recent example
of work which is critical of the more qualitative work produced by sociologists of
scienti c knowledge consider: Stéphane Baldi, “Normative Versus Social Constructivist
Processes in the Allocation of Citations: A Network-Analytic Model,” 63 American
Sociological Review 829 (1998).

69

Barry Barnes, T.S. Kuhn and Social Science (New York: Columbia University Press,1982);
Michael Mulkay, “Norms and Ideology in Science,” 4/5 Social Sciences Information 637
(1975).

70

94 S. Ct. 1879 (1974). See also Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Intern., 740 F.
Supp. 37, 77–79 (D. Mass. 1990).

71

94 S Ct 1879, 1890 (1974).

72

94 S Ct 1879, 1890 (1974).

73

These claims are more consistent with the work of Mitroff and Mulkay. Ian Mitroff,
“Norms and Counter-norms in a select group of the Apollo Moon Scientists: A Case
Study in the Ambivalence of Scientists,” 39 American Sociological Review 579–595
(1974); Michael Mulkay, “Interpretation and the use of rules: The case of the Norms of
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Science,” in T. Gieryn, ed., Science and Social Structure (A Festschrift for RK Merton) (New
York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1980), p. 111. For some recent studies providing
overviews of the shaping by commercial, state and public interests of the reward system,
normative ethos and professional ideologies of science, see Henry Etzkowitz and Andrew
Webster, “Science as Intellectual Property,” in Sheila Jasanoff, et al, eds., Handbook of
Science and Technology Studies (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1995), pp. 480–505; Helga Nowotny,
Peter Scott and Michael Gibbons, Rethinking Science: Knowledge and the Public in an Age
of Uncertainty (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2001); Philip Mirowski and Esther-Mirjam
Sent, eds., Science Bought and Sold: Essays in the Economics of Science (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 2002).
74

587 F.2d 1128 (D.C.Cir. 1978).

75

587 F.2d at 1147–1148.

76

74 F.Supp.2d 803 (N.D.Ill. 1999).

77

74 F.Supp.2d at 804.

78

74 F.Supp.2d at 807.

79

60 F.3d 913 (2nd Cir. 1994).

80

Compare the rhetorical importance of the (Huber inspired) laboratory-centered and
generally more restrictive models of science elaborated by the Court of Appeals in the
remand from Daubert, supra note 31.

81

60 F.3d at 933.

82

60 F.3d at 934–935.

83

Legal support for this proposition is drawn from: Weissmann v. Freeman, 868 F.2d 1313,
1324 (1989). Judges often seem to prefer legal authority to other sources of authority,
even when confronted with non-legal specialized knowledges. This tendency was conspicuous in early judicial descriptions of DNA typing technology, where prior judgments
were as common as scienti c texts; both as authority for admission and use as well as
descriptions of appropriate practice and the limitations associated with the technology.

84

Once again these representations are quite different to the motivations characterized as
legitimate by Huber, supra note 32.

85

60 F.3d at 940–941.

86

52 F.3d 967 (Fed. Cir. 1995).

87

Perhaps they were not clearly understood by judges. On the basis of support from preeminent institutions such as the AMA, NAS and AAAS, they may have — embracing
some kind of naïve realism — actually thought that Popper’s theory captured what is
often conceived as the privileged epistemology of science.

88

Though, we suspect many commentators such as Foster and Huber, supra note 38, were
not.

89

Oldroyd, supra note 1 at 308–315.

90

K Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, 2 volumes (London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1945).

91

Albury, supra note 19.

92

Magee, supra note 19.
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93

See, e.g., Stephen Odgers and James Richardson, “Keeping bad science out of the
courtroom – Changes in American and Australian expert evidence law,” 18 U. New South
Wales L. J. 108 (1995); Ian Freckelton, “Contemporary comment: When plight makes
right – The forensic abuse syndrome,” 18 Criminal Law Journal 29 (1994); Huber, supra
note 32; Foster and Huber, supra note 38; David Bernstein, “Junk science in the United
States and the Commonwealth,” 21 Yale J. International L. 123 (1996).

94

Gilbert and Mulkay, supra note 22.; Michael Mulkay, Sociology of Science: A Sociological
Pilgrimage (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991), p. 130.

95

We accept that the extent of the revolution is open to contestation. In part it depends
upon the emphasis of elements of novelty as opposed to continuity. It would be our
contention that falsi cation is frequently unworkable or of limited value as an admissibility criterion. This is not to suggest that Daubert is insigni cant, but rather to interpret
the Daubert, Joiner, Kumho “trilogy” as a shift in ethos or the inauguration of a new
regime which encouraged federal judges to be more critical about admissibility decisions.

96

In this regard Judge Weinstein’s oft-cited contention is emblematic: “An expert can be
found to testify to the truth of almost any factual theory, no matter how frivolous.” Jack
B. Weinstein, “Improving Expert Testimony,” 20 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 482 (1986).

97

For some discussion of the role of a literary or discursive technology consider: Timothy
Lenoir, “Inscription practices and materialities of communication,” in Timothy Lenoir,
ed., Inscribing Science: Scienti c texts and the materiality of communication (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 1–19; Simon Schaffer, “The Leviathan of Parsontown:
Literary Technology and scienti c representation” in Inscribing Science: Scienti c texts and
the materiality of communication, supra at pp. 182–222; Alan G. Gross, Joseph E.
Harmon and Michael Reidy, Communicating Science: The Scienti c Article from the 17th
Century to the Present (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).

98

The following are references to amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme Court in
relation to the Daubert appeal. AAAS and NAS, pp. 6, 7, 8, 10: “Science . . . represents a
process for re ning theoretical explanations about the world that are subject to further
testing and re nement,” “science does proceed through a series of interrelated steps
centered on the generation and testing of hypotheses,” “An hypothesis is accepted as
generally valid to the extent that it has survived repeated attempts at falsi cation”; AMA,
pp. 6–7, 9, 10, 11: “The scienti c method involves replicable, empirical testing of
hypotheses”; New England Journal of Medicine, p. 2; Carnegie Commission, pp. 5, 6, 9,
11, 12: “Scientists proceed by formulating hypotheses that they then test.” Other briefs
which endorsed Popper or testing include: American Law Professors; Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, p. 13; Respondent, p. 21; American Tort Reform Association, p. 8;
Product Liability Advisory Council, pp. 16–17; American College of Legal Medicine, p.
11; Bloembergen et al, pp. 3, 5, 7, 8, 12. It is also worth noting that many of the briefs
stressed the importance of publication and peer review, several citing Angell and Relman.
Notably, the NAS and AAAS brief cited Relman and Angell, Horrobin, Green and
Ziman. A brief submitted by eminent physicians, scientists and historians of science
seems to have made little identi able impact.

99

Given their seniority and Popper’s waning popularity, it is quite possible that Popper’s
philosophical writings were encountered by some of the judges during their university
education.
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100 Recourse to Popper’s work may have also opened the Court to exogeneous criticism —
Rehnquist CJ’s concern — and this may be one of the reasons why Popper is eventually,
in Barthes’ terminology, exnominated.
101 Historians and anthropologists seem to have been more re exive about their participation in legal settings and the judicial use of their professional work. See, e.g., Ruse,
Laudan and Quinn supra note 60.
102 See, e.g., Mary Bobinski, “Citation Sources and the New York Court of Appeals,” 34
Buffalo L. Rev. 965 (1985); Russell Smyth, “What do judges Cite? An Empirical Study of
the ‘Authority of Authority’ in the Supreme Court of Victoria,” 25 Monash U. L. Rev. 29
(1999). Compare: G. Nigel Gilbert, “Referencing as Persuasion,” 7 Social Studies of
Science 113 (1977); John Law and R.J. Williams, “Putting Facts Together: A Study of
Scienti c Persuasion,” 12 Social Studies of Science 535; Steven Yearley, “Textual Persuasion: The Role of Social Accounting in the Construction of Scienti c Arguments,” 11
Philosophy of the Social Sciences 409 (1981); Steve Woolgar, “Discovery: Logic and
Sequence in a Scienti c Text,” in Karin Knorr, Roger Krohn and Richard Whitley, eds.,
The Social Processes of Scienti c Investigation (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company,
1980) 239; G. Nigel Gilbert and Michael Mulkay, “Warranting Scienti c Belief,” 12
Social Studies of Science 383 (1982). For a more general critical appraisal of qualitative
and quantitative approaches consider the classic position advanced by Aaron Cicourel,
Method and Measurement in Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1964).
103 It appears as no coincidence that after the Daubert judgment the relevance of Popper
(and Daubert) was contested in the various amicus curiae briefs submitted to the Supreme
Court in relation to the admissibility standard for non-scienti c expert evidence. See also
Edmond (2002), supra note 51.
104 Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scienti c
Facts (London: Sage ,1979) p. 75.
105 Although there is no simple mathematical relationship between citation or its absence
indicating facticity. In some contexts citation may still act to bolster an established claim.
See also Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1987) pp. 21–62.
106 Latour and Woolgar, supra note 104 at 76.
107 Pierre Bourdieu, “The force of law: Toward a sociology of the juridical  eld,” 38 Hastings
L. J. 814 (1987).
108 The transformation of citations of Popper’s falsi cation into a more standardized legal
image of testing also resonates with Ravetz’s work on the standardization of facts. Ravetz
observed that “facts” which are useful to a speci c technological application may bear
little resemblance to their original formulation in a research context:
[W]hen the fact undergoes standardization, not merely the nuances of its
 rst intimation, but even some important but subtle aspects of its assertions or its objects, are smoothed over and forgotten. This seems and may
indeed be, a regrettable vulgarization, especially when the end by-product
is examined by an expert in the corresponding descendent  eld of research. But it is quite necessary, if the fact is to be useful to those who lack
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the time, skill, or inclination to master the elaborate theoretical context
in which its sophisticated versions are comprehensible.
Jerome Ravetz, Scienti c Knowledge and its Social Problems (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Books, 1973) p. 201. See also Stephen Hilgartner, “The Dominant View of Popularization: Conceptual Problems, Political Uses,” 20 Social Studies of Science 519 (1990).
109 Regardless of their reality, these anxieties had been prevalent since the mid 1980’s. See
Edmond and Mercer (2000), supra note 3.
110 It is arguable that the third Daubert criteria was a direct response to new diagnostic
technologies like DNA typing.
111 General Electric Co. v. Joiner 522 U.S. 136, 139 L Ed 2d 508, 519, 118 S. Ct. 512
(1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael 526 U.S. 137, 143 L Ed 2d 238, 119 S. Ct. 137
(1999). See also US v. Scheffer 523 U.S. 303, 140 L. Ed 2d 413, 118 S. Ct. 1261 (1998).
112 Several commentators have undertaken very critical reviews of the sociological work of
Latour and Jasanoff. See, e.g., Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont, Intellectual Impostures
(London: Pro le Books, 1998), pp. 115–123; David Bereby, “That Damned Elusive
Bruno Latour,” Lingua Franca 22 (Sept/Oct., 1994); Norman Levitt, Prometheus Bedeviled: Science and The Contradictions of Contemporary Culture (New Brunswick: University
Press, 1999). For some overviews of the so called Science Wars see Andrew Ross, ed.,
Science Wars (Durham, NC; Duke University Press, 1996); David Mercer, “The Higher
Moral Panic: Academic Scientism and its Quarells with Science and Technology Studies,”
17 Prometheus 77 (1999); Jay A. Labinger and Harry Collins, eds., The One Culture?: A
Conversation About Science (Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 2001).
113 Jonathan Potter, Representing Reality: Discourse, rhetoric and social construction (London,
Sage, 1996).
114 Mike Michael, “Lay Discourses of Science: Science in General, Science in Particular, and
Self,”17 Science Technology and Human Values 313 (1992).
115 Clifford Geertz, “Thick description: Toward an interpretative theory of culture” in C.
Geertz, The interpretation of cultures (New York, Basic Books, 1973) 3.
116 Conventionally, the long involvement of social science in US courts is linked to the
introduction of the Brandeis brief in Muller v. State of Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 28 S. Ct.
324 (1908). More recent and in uential work by Monahan and Walker provides an
indication of prevailing debates around the role of the social sciences. Monahan and
Walker proposed that  ndings of social scienti c work could be used by courts as a form
of precedent, comparable to the use of legal precedent. We would contend that this study
might illustrate some of the potential limitations to such a proposal. Because such
authority is often incorporated, quali ed and transmuted in judgments it would seem
that, apart from the logistics of monitoring ongoing research and assessing and weighing
(often competing) methodologies, such a model ignores the strategic and legitimatory
 exibility central to judicial decision making. See John Monahan and Laurens Walker,
“Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, and establishing social science in law,” 134 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 477 (1986); Social Science in Law: Cases and Materials (New York, The
Foundation Press, Inc., 1985); Laurens Walker and John Monahan, “Scienti c Authority: The Breast Implant Litigation and Beyond,” 86 Va. L. Rev. 801 (2000).
117 Consider: Harvey Sacks, “On doing ‘being ordinary’,” in Maxwell Atkinson and John
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Heritage, eds., Structures of Social Action: Studies in Conversation Analysis (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 413; Michael Moore, “Demonstrating the Rationality of an Occupation,” 8 Sociology 111 (1974).
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